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Tuesday, January 31, 2012

Rhodesia Oil Conspiracy, June 1976

The entrance to the Mobil Refinery near Durban, South Africa


An Investigation into how multinational oil companies 
provide Rhodesia's oil need

     This report is based on information and documents which were passed to the Centre for Social Action of the United Church of Christ by an organization called OKHELA. Enclosed with the material was a statement which read as follows:

     "Okhela is a clandestine organization of white South African militants who are engaged in providing invisible support to the National Liberation Struggle headed by the African National Congress of South Africa (ANC). This commitment to the ANC's fight against fascist Apartheid, settler colonialism and imperialism includes armed struggle. 

     "The material provided here was gathered by Okhela during a period of intensive research, with infiltration and intelligence work lasting over a year. The work took place in South Africa, Rhodesia, Mozambique, the Netherlands, Britain and the United States.This is a continuation of an Okhela programme of carrying out clandestine operations both inside and outside of South Africa to expose the nature of Western Capitalist collaboration with the racist  minority regimes in Southern Africa".         

     The Centre for Social Action of the United Church of Christ (CSA) was approached by Okhela to write and publish this report because the Centre's earlier research and activity on the issue of Rhodesian sanctions. Prior to the publication of this report, the CSA exposed the illegal sanctions-breaking activities in which the New York office of Air Rhodesia was engaged. That revelation culminated in the closing down of Air Rhodesia's New York office. The CSA further launched a nationwide campaign aimed at travel agencies that were promoting American tourism to Rhodesia.

June 21, 1976    
Additional copies of this report can be obtained from:
The Centre for Social Action
8th Floor
297 Park Avenue South
New York, New York 10010
United States of America

The printing of this report has been made possible, in part, by a grant from the Robin Flemings Fund   



Chapter 1:  Summary

Chapter 2:  Introduction

2.1  Historical background
2.2  Sanctions
2.3  Western ambivalence over sanctions
2.4  Implications for the U.S. government

Chapter 3:  The background on oil

3.1  The legal background
3.2  Rhodesia's oil needs

Chapter 4:  How sanctions have been evaded

4.1  Early methods
4.2  Genta
4.3  Mobil
4.4  The gasoline paper chase
4.5  The improved paper chase
4.6  The diesel paper chase
4.7  Aviation turbine fuel (Avtur)
4.8  Aviation gasoline (Avgas)
4.9  Non-fuel oil products

Chapter 5:  The evidence 
5.1  Origins of documents
5.2  Selected quotes from documents
5.3  Document 1:  Letter from Genta to Mobil (Rhodesia)
5.4  Document 2:  Letter from Mobil (South Africa) to Mobil (Rhodesia).
5.5  Document 3:  Mobil's imports of non-fuel products
5.6  Documents 4, 5, 6:  Mobil (Rhodesia) and the middle-men 
5.7  Documents 7, 8:  Two revealing invoices   
5.8  Documents 9, 10:  Rhodesia's fuel consumption
5.9  Document 11:  Financial links
5.10  Documents12, 13, 14:  Mobil's internal finances

Chapter 6:  The role of other oil companies

Chapter 7:  The importation routes

Chapter 8:  More on Freight Services Ltd.

Chapter 9:  Some legal points


A.  List of names
B.  Document 15
C.  Document 16
D.  Document 17
E.  Document 18

Map Southern Africa routes




     In 1973, Americans learned during the Arab oil embargo, just what a shortage of petroleum could do to their livelihood. Supposedly a much more serious trade embargo has been in force against Rhodesia's white minority regime for the past decade. But petroleum shipments to Rhodesia have continued almost without disruption, despite of the resolution of the United Nations Security Council making trade sanctions obligatory by all member states to achieve majority rule in Rhodesia. 

     Today, the tiny white population of Rhodesia hangs onto power with a tenacity few could have foreseen. But no amount of determination by them could have kept their economy and military machine operating if they had not received a steady flow of oil supplies.

     This report reveals - for the first time - how oil seems to be getting through and keeping white rule alive in Rhodesia. The Centre for Social Action of the United Church of Christ has obtained a series of revealing secret documents, which appear to show that Mobil Oil Corporations subsidiaries in South Africa and Rhodesia have jointly helped to plan and implement a decade long sanctions-breaking campaign to provide for Rhodesia's oil needs. 

     Mobil has repeatedly denied any sanctions-breaking activity. Mobil's Chairman, Rawleigh Wagner Jr., has said that since U.S. law forbids Mobil and its affiliates from engaging in any transaction involving goods destined for Rhodesia, "the management of Mobil's International Division has gone to considerable effort to make sure that we have complied fully with the restrictions imposed upon us by the U.S. government in this connection". 

     Yet it would appear that if he consulted with his International Division Executive Vice President, who is also a Director of Mobil (South Africa), he might learn what is explained in this report - namely, that a highly sophisticated scheme seems to have been operated by Mobil (South Africa) for ten years, whereby the latter has sold oil products to Rhodesia through an agreed chain of intermediary South African Companies, most of which are in fact bogus. These products were ultimately retailed by oil companies within Rhodesia, including Mobil's Rhodesian subsidiary. The intention of the scheme seems to have been to allow oil products to get through this chain without the eventual destination being discovered by outside observers. But even if the destination were discovered, the scheme also seems to have been constructed to conceal from all but the most diligent researcher, that Mobil Oil (South Africa) had any intention of selling goods which were bound for Rhodesia.             
     We believe that the documents presented here with and other relevant evidence tends to establish at least on a prima facie basis that: 
  • Mobil Rhodesia was asked in the mid-sixties by a secret Rhodesian government agency called Genta to set up a "paper-chase" of intermediary companies, through which Genta could import all of Rhodesia's gasoline and diesel requirements from Mobil Oil (South Africa);     
  • Other oil companies in South Africa - Shell, B.P. Total and Caltex - have set up similar procedures to get oil products to Rhodesia;  
  • A confidential memorandum within Mobil (Rhodesia) stated: "When orders for lubricants and solvents are placed on our South African associates [ (i.e.  Mobil (South Africa) ], a carefully planned "paper-chase" is used to disguise the final destination of these products. This is necessary in order to make sure that there is no link  between MOSA (Mobil South Africa) and MOSR (Mobile Rhodesia) supplies . . . . This 'paper-chase' which costs very little to administer, is done primarily to hide the fact that MOSA is in fact supplying MOSR with products in contravention of U.S. Sanctions Regulation . . . . "   




     Rhodesia is ruled by one of the two remaining white minority regimes in Southern Africa. Britain began its colonial rule on Rhodesia between the years 1889 and 1986 through treachery and with the aid of its troops stationed in South Africa. This was the first step in an attempt  to realize the dream of Cecil John Rhodes - a dream of "British soil from the Cape to Cairo". As numbers of white settlers grew, political decisions were made within Rhodesia by a totally white electorate as the franchise was restricted by financial qualifications to exclude African participation. Although Britain maintained constitutional authority, it never exercised its power to veto discriminatory legislation.

     In 1963 Rhodesian whites began to agitate for independence from Britain. In the negotiations, Britain's condition for granting of full independence was the guaranteeing of basic human rights to the large majority of the population, the colonized Africans. This was unacceptable to to white Rhodesians and they immediately began making preparations for a unilateral declaration of independence from Britain. Following the breakdown of talks with Britain, the Smith regime declared Rhodesia independent on November 11th, 1965. On March 1, 1970, Rhodesia proclaimed itself a Republic and announced an election on a new constitution in which less than one percent of the total population (95% African) was permitted to vote.


     When white Rhodesians declared Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI), they did so with almost no diplomatic support. But economically they were not left stranded. In the months before UDI, the government and foreign-owned industry made preparations for the expected international sanctions. Mining companies like Union Carbide transferred large mineral stockpiles to ports in territories neighbouring Rhodesia, where country-of-origin would be more difficult for sanctions enforcers to determine. Tobacco stockpiles, too, were set up by the regime to cushion white farmers from severe financial losses. With no seaport and no oil wells, the Smith government facing UDI saw accessing oil as its weakest link.

     Britain's punitive measures in response to UDI was the imposition of economic sanctions. Initially these were implemented slowly, voluntarily and selectively. Under much pressure Britain eventually called a meeting of the United Nations Security Council in December 1966, and agreed to the imposition of mandatory sanctions, which were confined to oil, asbestos, iron ore, chrome, sugar, tobacco, copper, meat, hides and skins. As selective sanctions proved difficult to implement the Afro-Asian states decided in April 1968 to call for comprehensive sanctions which covered items such as travel, finances and arms. Britain conceded and Security Council Resolution 253 was passed, making it illegal for any United Nations member state to trade or have any financial dealings with Rhodesia. Only Portugal and South Africa refused top abide by this decision.

     The United States voted in the U.N. Security Council to support economic sanctions, and furthermore the President promulgated two Executive Orders, numbers 11322 and 11419, prohibiting the trade by any person or company subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.


     Britain, which initiated economic sanctions against Rhodesia, did so not only ambivalently but primarily to "save face" with the Afro-Asian nations. Prime Minister Harold Wilson went so far as to inform Smith of the kind of sanctions Britain would apply, singling oil and tobacco to ward off UDI. As a result, when UDI was declared Smith was well prepared for sanctions, while Britain had neither as plan for implementation nor a method for enforcement. Having a favourable balance of trade with, and the largest investment in, South Africa and realizing that South Africa would go to the aid of white Rhodesia, Britain naturally acted with caution not to upset South Africa. Britain therefore stalled pressures for comprehensive sanctions for three years, during which time Smith was able to diversify and consolidate the Rhodesian economy and find new trading partners.

     Britain and other Western countries have another reason for their ambivalence on sanctions. Should sanctions prove effective in the case of Rhodesia, a precedent would be set for extending sanctions to South Africa. If this situation were to materialize the huge financial investments that the USA, Britain, West Germany, France and others have in South Africa would suffer.
     Using the United States as a case study on how sanctions have been evaded, we see the following:

  • In a secret National Security Study Memorandum No. 39 (which was subsequently leaked), option 2, which was later adopted, was for the U.S. to "gradually relax sanctions" against Rhodesia;  
  • Union Carbide, which has enormous economic interests in Rhodesia, put much effort and money into changing the U.S. law, in order to exempt chrome from sanctions regulations under the guise of its being a strategic mineral;
  • The Centre for Social Action for the United Church of Christ disclosed the sanctions-breaking activities of the Air Rhodesia office in New York, of other travel-related companies such as Hertz and Holiday Inn, and of hundreds of travel agencies that were setting up tours to Rhodesia, in violation of U.N. sanctions regulations. This information was given to the State Department, the Treasury, the Commerce Department and the Federal Aviation Authority, but it was virtually ignored and certainly no prosecutions made; 
  • Rhodesia has been able to recruit mercenaries in the U.S. 


     This report provides the most important single revelation of apparent sanctions-breaking to have been made in the ten years since UDI. It provides highly detailed information on how Rhodesia appears to have been importing the one commodity it cannot do without and cannot obtain within within its own borders, namely oil, through the cooperative activities of Rhodesian, South African subsidiaries of oil companies whose head offices are in France, Britain, the Netherlands and the United States.

     The evidence produced in this report tends to demonstrate that Mobil, an American-based company, may have played a more central role than any other company in enabling Rhodesia to obtain the oil products it needs so that its economy and armed forces can continue to function. The Centre for Social Action demands an investigation by the U.S. Administration and the Congress to see whether Mobil is guilty of breaking U.N. sanctions and U.S. law.    

     Secretary of State Kissinger said during his speech in Zambia on April 27 1976:

  • "The United States will take steps to fulfill completely its obligations under international law to implement mandatory sanctions against Rhodesia" 
          He went on to add:
  • "In parallel with this effort, we will approach other industrial nations to insure the strictest and broadest international compliance with sanction" 
     It was generally understood that this latter reference alluded not only to Western European nations but also to South Africa, and presumably this is one item that will be on the agenda in the meeting between Kissinger and Vorster in West Germany on June 23 and 24, 1976. 

  • to stand by the words of its own Secretary of State;
  • to implement U.S. law; carefully examine the documentary and factual evidence presented herewith; and to seek further evidence with a view to prosecuting Mobil Oil Corporation, and any Mobil directors and executives in so far as they have engaged in illegal sanctions-breaking;   
  • to press the South African government to prevent South African subsidiaries of American, British, Dutch and French oil companies from arranging the provision of Rhodesia's oil requirements.





     In November 1965, the United Nations Security Council recommended to its member states that sanctions be implemented against Rhodesia on a voluntary basis. When this proved to be ineffective, the Security Council went on in December 1966 to impose selective but mandatory sanctions. One of the commodities covered was oil. U.N.S.C. resolution 232 stated:
  • "The Security Council . . . . . . decides that all State members of the United Nations shall prevent . . . participation in their territories . . . . . or by nationals or vessels of their registration in the supply of oil or oil products in Southern Rhodesia"   
(Our italics. Rhodesia is still sometimes referred to as 'Southern Rhodesia'.)

     In May 1968 the Security Council the Security Council extended mandatory sanctions to cover all goods other than certain humanitarian supplies. U.N.S.C. resolution 253 stated:
  • "The Security Council  . . . . . decides that . . . . . all State members of the United Nations shall prevent . . . . . the sale or supply by their nationals or from their territories of any commodities or products . . . . . to any person or body in Southern Rhodesia or to any other person or body for the purposes of any business carried out on in or operated from Southern Rhodesia, and any activities by their nationals or in their territories which promote or are calculated to promote such sale or supply"
     After the passing of these two resolutions, the United States, together with nearly all other U.N. member nations, incorporated the essential clauses of the sanctions regulations into their own legal statutes. For instance, United States Executive Order 11419, signed by President Johnson in July 1968, said in part:
  • "The following [is] prohibited effective immediately . . . . . : Sale or supply by any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, or any other activities by any such person or body which promote or are calculated to promote the sale or supply, to any person or body in Southern Rhodesia or to any person or body for the purposes of any business carried on or operated from Southern Rhodesia, of any commodities or products . . . . . The term "person" means an individual, partnership, association or other unincorporated body of individual, or corporation."
     Clearly it is illegal for American firms to supply products to Rhodesia; and it is illegal for them to carry out activities which "are calculated to promote the supply" to Rhodesia of such products. This aspect of the law is crucial, because it prevents the sale of products to somebody outside Rhodesia when the intention is that that person will resell then to Rhodesia. Thus any American company  which enables or allows its subsidiary in Rhodesia to bypass the sanctions regulations is violating the letter and spirit of the U.S. law. (Further details of the sanctions regulations can be found in Chapter 9)

     In October 1975, Rev. Robert Powell of the National Council of Churches of Christ and chairperson of the I.C.C.R.'s Southern Africa project, wrote to Rawleigh Warner Jr., Chairman of the Board of the Mobil Oil Corporation, asking various questions about the role of Mobil in Southern Africa, with particular reference to the supply of oil and oil products to Rhodesia. On November 13, 1975, Mr. Warner replied:
  • [After UDI in 1965] the U.S. government imposed certain prohibitions on transactions by companies like Mobil and its affiliates with Southern Rhodesia which had the effect of prohibiting the Mobil group of companies from engaging outside Rhodesia in any transaction involving goods . . . . . destined for Rhodesia. . . . . . The management of our International Division has gone to considerable effort to make sure that we have complied fully with the restrictions imposed upon us by the U.S. government in this connection                
  • "neither Mobil nor any of its other affiliates engage in any business transactions with [Mobil Rhodesia] and . . . . . has no control over its operations. This applies to Mobil's affiliate in South Africa as well as all other Mobil affiliates".             
(Our italics. The letter is shown in the full appendix).

     From the evidence produced in this report, we believe it is fair to deduce that the statements made above by Mobil's Chairman are not in fact correct. Indeed, far from obeying U.N. regulation as well as U.S. legislation and the laws of their respective countries, Mobil, Caltex, Shell, BP and Total appear to have engaged in the last ten years in arranging  the supply to Rhodesia of virtually all of its requirements of fuel and other oil products. 


     Crude oil, when it emerges from the ground, is a black, sticky and uninteresting-looking liquid. But its properties are remarkable. It can be refined into a large variety of oil derivatives (collectively known in the oil trade as "products" or "products"). These include fuels such as:
  • premium gasoline
  • regular gasoline
  • diesel fuel (also known as A.D.O. - "Automotive Diesel Fuel")
  • power kerosene
  • illuminating kerosene
  • liquefied petroleum gas (such as Butane and Propane, and generally as L.P.G.)
  • Avtur (aviation turbine fuel)
  • Avgas (aviation gasoline) 
      Also, there are what we call non-fuel oil products, namely: 
  • lubricants
  • greases
  • waxes
  • solvents
  • bitumens
  • asphalts
  • plus various other specialized products.
     Oil products are needed not only for fuelling vehicles, but also for everything from bonding sole onto shoes to surfacing the roads along which those shoes will walk. Every country needs oil products if its economy is not to collapse. Rhodesia is no exception.

     Shortly before UDI, a pipeline to carry crude oil was built from Beira on the Mozambican coast (see map at the rear side of the cover) to Umtali in Rhodesia. At Umtali an oil refinery was built by a consortium in which the principle partners were Mobil, Caltex, Total, Shell and BP. These were the first companies marketing oil products in Rhodesia. This refinery could produce virtually all the oil products that Rhodesia needed. However, after the imposition of voluntary sanctions in November 1965, the refinery was starved of crude oil.  

     In the spring of 1966, the Smith regime attempted to go around sanctions regulations by arranging through intermediaries for an oil tanker, the Joanna V, to be purchased while on the high seas. It then sailed to Beira with in cargo of some 400,000 tons of crude oil, which would be about enough to supply Rhodesia's crude oil needs for about a year. After intensive diplomatic activity, the Joanna V was prevented from unloading its cargo and Britain was was empowered by the United Nations to use force to prevent other tankers from bringing crude oil to Beira. Britain's naval blockade of Beira continued until 1976, when the newly independent Mozambique declared that it would enforce sanctions. (Before independence, Mozambique was a Portuguese colony, and Portugal under Salazar and Caetano had refused to impose sanctions).

     Unfortunately for Rhodesia, there was no refinery in Beira, so it was clear that if any crude oil came to Beira it must be intended for the Rhodesian refinery at the other end of the Beira pipeline. Since early 1966, the pipeline has not been used and the Rhodesian refinery fallen into disrepair. The oil left in the pipeline - some 14,000 tons - has lain dormant, and there was even a dispute about who owns it.

     Many thought that this represented the beginning of the end for Rhodesia. It was impossible to import crude oil, and the only alternative was to import a whole range of oil products over lengthy land routes. This was not only expensive, but it would also involve evading of sanctions regulations for the importation of each product.

     However, to the consternation of those who maintained that sanctions regulations would finish the Smith regime "within weeks, not months", it became clear from the reports of visitors to Rhodesia that oil products were soon arriving from somewhere else. Gas stations operated by the Rhodesian subsidiaries of Mobil, Caltex, Shell, BP and Total continued selling their usual range of products. The most that oil companies in Rhodesia would say was that they bought their products from a government agency within Rhodesia; yet their parent companies outside Rhodesia denied supplying Rhodesia and said that their Rhodesian subsidiaries were beyond their control, now answerable to the Rhodesian government.              

     The great unanswered question hanging over the sanctions strategy of the last ten years has been: how does Rhodesia get its oil products? 

     Thanks to the information and documents supplied by Okhela, the Centre for Social Action of the United Church of Christ believes it is now possible to construct a description in considerable detail of how Rhodesia seems to have obtained its oil products since UDI, and how international oil companies - especially Mobil - have played what appears to be the central role in arranging for the provision of these products. 




     The documents that Okhela has supplied to the Centre for Social Action (CSA) appear for the most to be confidential Mobil reports, plus letters to and from Mobil (Rhodesia) and Mobil (South Africa). Many of these are highly complex and use technical terminology. The documents themselves are shown and explained in Chapter 5 and the Appendix.

     Throughout the rest of this report, any information that is provided comes from three sources:
  • the documents provided by Okhela;
  • further information that was provided by CSA by Okhela, and which is based on their own investigations. According to Okhela, this information was mostly obtained from strategically placed-sources in South Africa and Rhodesia;
  • occasional press reports.      
     It should be understood that the following account contains allegations which we believe should be scrutinized most carefully by the relevant authorities. Because much of the evidence comes from sources which cannot be publicly revealed or named, the CSA does not claim that all of what follows is provable in court. What it does say is that the allegations made in Okhela's report require a most careful and thorough investigation so that the facts may be laid open to public scrutiny. If laws have been violated then prosecutions should follow.


     The oil companies in Rhodesia were nervous immediately after UDI, and told the government that because of sanctions regulations they would be unable to import oil products. But then it became clear that so long as two of Rhodesia's neighbours, South Africa and Mozambique, were prepared to help or turn a blind eye, ways could be found of evading sanctions without the role of the oil companies being detected.

     Very rough and ready methods were used at first, making use of hastily commandeered road transport. On February 5, 1966. after an intensive surveillance of the South African-Rhodesian border at Beit Bridge, the Rand Daily Mail reported that three to four vehicles per day were crossing the border with fuel supplies for Rhodesia. A photograph of a Rhodesian fuel tanker was published; just visible through a thin coat of grey paint was a large "P" - part of the "BP" insignia of the British Petroleum Company, in which the British government holds a controlling interest.

     Soon Shell joined in, then the other oil companies. More and more trucks crossing the border, carrying fuel to Rhodesia from the various South African refineries. The ownership and origins of the trucks were secret, but by February 16, according to the Rand Daily Mail, 35,000 gallons of of fuel were crossing the border each day; and the same amount was coming in from Mozambique. The British government casually dismissed reports that Rhodesia was obtaining nearly enough fuel to satisfy its needs, by saying that these were wild exaggerations and "very clearly highly coloured" (See UDI, by Robert C Good, published Faber and Faber, London 1973).

     The disadvantage to the oil companies of using road transport was that it was expensive and somewhat unreliable. Rail transport avoided these problems to a fair degree; but the rail systems of South Africa and Portuguese-ruled Mozambique were government controlled. The two governments concerned were prepared to condone the freelance activities of the road transport companies that oil companies were using; but politically it was a rather more provocative act to allow their own railway systems to be used. There was always the possibility that the British would suggest that U.N. sanctions (at least on vital commodities like oil) be extended to apply to South Africa and Portugal if they helped Rhodesia too blatantly. But Britain, mindful of the extensive investments in, and trade with South Africa did no such thing. So the oil companies obtained permission to transfer the transportation of fuel from road to rail. At that time the Beit Bridge rail link from South Africa to Rhodesia had not been built. This meant that the most economical route for oil going from South African refineries to Lourenzo Marques (Mozambique) by ship or rail, and then by rail from Lourenzo Marques to Rhodesia. No public acknowledgement of this was made; but, however much one attempts to conceal ownership and destination, it is hard to disguise the presence of a trainload of oil wagons. By mid-1967 the British Granada TV estimated from its own observations that about 140,000 gallons of fuel per day was going by rail to Rhodesia via Mozambique.                     

4.2  GENTA

     Once the immediate crisis was over, it became necessary to rationalize the whole business of oil importation, both to ensure its security and to improve long term planning. By now the Rhodesian government had set up a secret agency called GENTA. Ostensibly a private company, it is obscurely listed a Rhodesian telephone company as "Genta (Pvt) Limited", with an address in Central Salisbury. In fact, it is 100% owned by the Rhodesian government, and its chairman (George Atmore) and operation manager (D Airey) were previously civil servants in the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. Few people in Rhodesia know of Genta's existence, let alone role.

     Genta's actual role since its establishment has been twofold: firstly, it serves as a front, to act on behalf of the government; secondly, it exerts a tight control over importation into Rhodesia of the principal oil products and over the activities of the Rhodesian subsidiaries of the various oil companies. Indeed it was Genta which arranged the purchase of the oil tanker Joanna V, mentioned earlier.      

     Genta's first significant act was to tell the oil companies that it would be responsible for the importation into Rhodesia of fuel products. It would then sell these to the oil companies within Rhodesia for subsequent marketing at their respective gas stations. But for non-fuel oil products, such as lubricants, the oil companies would have to arrange their own importation.

     Rhodesia is a land of secrets. Its strict Official Secrets Act makes any talk about the oil industry illegal. The photographer who took the pictures of Rhodesian oil installations shown in chapter 7 would be subject to heavy penalties if apprehended; and several well-known persons, including two accused of working for the C.I.A., have been jailed for probing the country's sanctions secrets.

     However, some things are obviously more secret than others. And one of the biggest secrets of all is that having been told that they must buy their fuel products from Genta, the oil companies in Rhodesia were then asked to set up procedures whereby Genta could import the fuel from their sister companies in South Africa. 

4.3  MOBIL

     An equally remarkable secret is that the task of arranging the importation of most of Rhodesia's gasoline (both premium and regular) and diesel and Avtar was apparently allocated by Genta to one company - Mobil. Other companies were allocated the task of importing Rhodesia's requirements of other fuels - for instance, Shell imported the Avgas 100/130.

     Before explaining Mobil's role in providing Rhodesia's fuel needs, it is necessary to provide a little information on some of the companies and subsidiaries involved.

     The Mobil Oil Corporation - which we will call Mobil (USA) - is the world's eighth largest company, with assets and annual sales both valued at around $ 9 billion. It is a U.S.A. registered company, but it has subsidiaries registered in dozens of other countries. Its two principle subsidiaries in South Africa both wholly owned are:

  1. Mobil Oil Southern Africa (Propriety) Ltd, which we will refer to as Mobil (South Africa), and which internal Mobil documents refer to as MOSA; and
  2. The Mobil Refining Company Southern Africa (Propriety) Ltd, which we will refer as 'the' Mobil Refinery (because it runs Mobil's only refinery in the Southern half of Africa, at Durban in South Africa), and which internal Mobil documents refer to as 'Moref'.            
     Mobil's principle subsidiary in Rhodesia, also wholly owned, is Mobil Oil Southern Rhodesia (Private) Limited. We will refer to this as Mobil (Rhodesia), and internal documents refer to it as MOSR.

     [When the context is obvious, the word "Mobil" is sometimes used within this report to refer to Mobil (South Africa) or Mobil (Rhodesia), as appropriate.]        

     Once the refinery in Rhodesia became starved of crude oil, Mobil (Rhodesia) had to obtain nearly all of its oil products from the Mobil refinery in Durban. All marketing of Mobil Refinery products is carried out by Mobil (South Africa), so that for Mobil (Rhodesia) to obtain its its oil products, it had to purchase them from Mobil (South Africa). But here there was a problem, brought about by sanctions regulations. In the words of Mobil Chairman Warner, these regulations "had the effect of prohibiting the Mobil group of companies from engaging in transactions involving goods destined for Rhodesia . . . . ." Thus it seems that in order for Mobil (South Africa) to supply Mobil (Rhodesia), some way had to be found to cloak the transactions so as to go around sanctions regulations.

     It appears that an elaborate scheme was then devised to make it look as if Mobil (South Africa) was not involved in any trade with Rhodesia. The physical transportation of oil products from the Mobil refinery  to Rhodesia posed no real problem, since unmarked railway cars were used. The problem lay in the paperwork, because nowhere in Mobil (South Africa)'s accounts department should there be copy of an invoice billing a Rhodesian company.

     The scheme consisted of creating what was termed a "paper-chase" - in Watergate parlance it might be called "laundering of gasoline". This paper-chase was a system whereby sales and payments would be passed through various South African companies which acted as intermediaries. Thus Mobil (South Africa) could sell products to a South African company, knowing that they would be passed on to other companies, which would eventually send them to a recipient in Rhodesia. If Mobil (South Africa) were asked whether they provided oil products for Rhodesia, they could evade the question by stating that they did not know what these companies did with the oil.

     Even if some smart investigator managed to show them certain Mobil products had found its way Rhodesia, Mobil was safe - so long as nobody could prove that the intention on the part of Mobil was for the products to reach Rhodesia. For if the intent to supply Rhodesia could be proved Mobil (South Africa)'s parent company in the USA might be liable to heavy penalties under US law, provided it could be shown that its Rhodesian subsidiary, or US citizens, goods of US origin, were involved in the scheme. Thus it was necessary to set up the paper-chase in great secrecy; in particular, it was crucial that very few people within Mobil and none outside had knowledge of all the companies actually involved as intermediaries, or had access to the highly incriminating Mobil documents in which the overall scheme was described.                       

     The paper-chase that was first used was relatively simple; but as we shall show, it was later made much more sophisticated. Over the years it has proved such an effective method of evading sanctions, that the only thing which stopped stopped Rhodesia increasing its imports was a shortage of foreign exchange. If the Rhodesians could pay for more oil, the companies in South Africa could provide it. 

Diagram 1

Flow diagram showing how gasoline was apparently sold by Mobil to Genta 
(Before September 1968)
Flow diagram showing how gasoline apparently sold by Mobil (South Africa) to Genta
(After September 1968)


     The method used until August 1968 for the importation of most of Rhodesia's gasoline requirements, which is illustrated in diagram 1, was as follows: on receiving instructions concerning quantities required by Genta, Mobil (South Africa) sold the required amount of gasoline to SASOL. (This is the South African oil-from-coal company, and is 100% owned by the South African government). Sasol in turn sold exactly the same amount of gasoline to a South African company called Parry Leon and Hayhoe, at P.O. Box 1101, Johannesburg. Parry Leon and Hayhoe then sent to Mobil (Rhodesia) a copy of the invoice that they had just received from Sasol. This was because it was generally agreed with Parry Leon and Hayhoe should avoid writing out any invoice on which Mobil (Rhodesia)'s name was mentioned; so Mobil (Rhodesia) promised to treat this copy (of an invoice from Sasol to Parry Leon and Hayhoe) as if it was an invoice made out to them. Mobil (Rhodesia) then sold the gasoline in agreed proportions to the five oil companies in Rhodesia (Mobil, Caltex, Total, Shell and BP). This meant that Mobil (Rhodesia) bought back from Genta some of the fuel it had imported on Genta's behalf. It also meant that gas stations in Rhodesia belonging to Shell, BP, Total and Caltex were all selling gasoline that had been produced at the Mobil Refinery in Durban.

     The payment scheme then took place in reverse: Genta paid Mobil (Rhodesia), who paid Parry Leon and Hayhoe who paid Sasol, who paid Mobil (South Africa).

     Thus a way had been devised for getting gasoline from Mobil (South Africa) to Genta via Mobil (Rhodesia), with the active assistance of a South African state-owned intermediary (Sasol), and without there being any documentary evidence of a sale to a Rhodesian company by any of the three companies involved in South Africa. 

     Although this may appear to have been a relatively foolproof method, Genta was still not satisfied that it was sufficiently safe. There was always the possibility that an investigation might take place - for instance, the United States government might insist that Mobil carry out investigative work, to check on the ultimate destination of all its large sales of gasoline.     


     At Genta's insistence, Mobil (Rhodesia) and Mobil South Africa) then devised a more sophisticated method for importing gasoline. By this time Parry Leon and Hayhoe had been amalgamated into a large South African firm called Freight Services Ltd., a shipping and forwarding company based in Johannesburg. Freight Services Ltd. has from the beginning played an absolutely crucial role as a middleman in evading Rhodesian sanctions. The first thing that Freight Services L:td. did as part of the "new" method of sending gasoline to Rhodesia was to rent P.O. Box number 31883 at Braamfontein (in Johannesburg), and to use this address as a bogus company they invented called Minerals Exploration Ltd

     Two other bogus companies were also invented. The first was called Rand Oils Ltd; this used the mailing address P.O. Box number 2581, Johannesburg, and was operated by a man called David D. Patrick. The second was named the Western Transvaal Development and Exploration Company, and used the address P.O. Box 677, Lichtenburg, Transvaal. This was operated by an attorney called Arnold Jacobus Oberholzer, of the legal firm Oberholzer and van Straaten, at P.O. Box 396, Lichtenburg.    

     The ordering of gasoline was a relatively simple process. Genta specified to Mobil (Rhodesia) how much gasoline they wanted from Mobil (South Africa); Mobil in Rhodesia then passed this request on by letter, telex or telephone. But the method whereby the gasoline was then sold to Genta via a chain of intermediaries was far more complicated. 

     As illustrated in Diagram 1, consecutive shipments of gasoline were handled in different ways. All would be sent first by Mobil (South Africa) to Sasol but then took varying paths. One shipment would be apparently resold by Sasol to Rand Oils Ltd., who would resell it to Minerals Exploration. The fourth shipment would then take the first route again and so on. 

     However, it was not only the companies involved that were bogus tools. Let us take take an example a shipment of 10,000 litres premium gasoline sold along the right hand line, i.e. from Mobil (South Africa) to Sasol, was genuine enough. But then things become a little more clouded. Which was of course the intention. Sasol filled in an invoice (for example, invoice number 12345), the sale of 10,000 premium. On receiving this W.T. Development) (i.e. Mr. Oberholzer in his attorney's office) filled in an invoice form with the W.T Development letter-head, which had specifically been printed for this purpose by Freight Services Ltd., billing Rand Oils (i.e. David D Patrick for the sale of 10,000 litres of premium. Only Mr. Oberholzer put the same date and the same invoice number as he had just found on the invoice from Sasol. When Mr. Patrick received the invoice, hefilled in an invoice form with the bogus Rand Oils letter-head again putting the same date and invoice number and bill Minerals Exploration for the sale of 10,000 litres of premium.

     Minerals Exploration then filled in an invoice billing the Genta account at the Netherlands Bank (a South African bank). The Netherlands bank had standing instructions to pay Minerals Exploration out of the Genta account upon receiving such an invoice from Minerals Exploration. Then Minerals exploration, instead of paying Rand Oils (who had theoretically sold them the consignment of 10,000 litres premium (and bypassed both them and W.T. Development, and made payment direct to Sasol. - despite the fact that Sasol had never made out a bill to them. Finally Sasol paid Mobil (South Africa).

     To avoid delays that sometimes resulted from the large number of middlemen involved, Sasol arranged to send directly to Minerals Exploration, in a sealed envelope a copy of the invoice selling the gasoline to W.T Development (if we continue follow this particular example). Thus Minerals Exploration received a copy of invoice 12345 from Sasol to W.T. Development billing the latter for 10,000 litres premium. Although Minerals Exploration was not mentioned anywhere on that invoice they then knew that the paper-chase had begun and that some time later they would receive an invoice number 12345 from Rand Oils billing them for the same amount of premium. The receipt of the duplicate invoice number 12345 from Sasol to W.T Development therefore served as an authorization for for Minerals Exploration to proceed immediately with billing the Netherlands Bank (Genta account) for the amount of of premium mentioned in the duplicate. In fact, this meant that the bank could then pay them for the premium before they even received the invoice actually made out to them by Rand Oils. In Mobil parlance, Minerals Exploration was authorized to use the duplicate invoice from Sasol as their "action document".         

     Genta was able to keep track of the whole procedure at one step removed, because whenever the Netherlands Bank received an invoice from Minerals Exploration, they sent to Genta a copy of that invoice. This was their way of telling Genta that they had paid Minerals Exploration out of the Genta account for the amount of gasoline mentioned on that invoice.

     The only place where Mobil (Rhodesia) featured in the whole cycle was when Minerals Exploration sent them, for statistical purposes, those very same copy invoices that they had received directly from Sasol.

     By 1971, the payment procedure had been modified slightly, in that the Minerals Exploration bills to Genta were sent care of the Rhodesian Mission in Johannesburg, rather than care of of the Netherlands Bank. 

     The most significant aspect of the whole operation was that Mobil (Rhodesia) could claim that it was not buying gasoline from outside of Rhodesia. But what was happening was that Mobil (South Africa) was secretly arranging to supply Rhodesia with its gasoline requirements. The role of Mobil (Rhodesia) was to help set up the paper-chase, i.e. the chain of intermediaries, whereby Genta could import gasoline. Genta then resold this gasoline to all the oil companies in Rhodesia - including Mobil.

     Various other objectives were achieved by this apparently laborious procedure. Firstly, none of the companies concerned sold the premium to an address in Rhodesia - the nearest they came to it was when Minerals Exploration sold it to Genta care of their agents in South Africa, i.e the Netherlands Bank. Secondly, Minerals Exploration was a front behind which the company doing the most crucial work (namely Freight Services Ltd.) was able to hide. Thirdly, neither Rand Oils nor W.T. Development had to be entrusted with actually handling the vast quantities of money involved in paying for these shipments. Fourthly, neither of these companies were able to compile statistics on the full extent of the traffic, because neither was involved in all the shipments. Finally, there were nowhere within Sasol's sales department any evidence that Minerals Exploration was buying so much gasoline from Sasol - for two shipments out of three were apparently sold by Sasol to Rand Oils or W.T Development. This was important, because Sasol was owned by the South African government, and it could have caused embarrassment if it was realized that Sasol was selling so much gasoline to a company acting as a front for Freight Services Ltd., which was involved in a number of other sanctions-breaking activities. The fact that Sasol was secretly sending duplicate invoices directly to Minerals Exploration provides some evidence that Sasol was aware of the true nature of the whole operation. 

Diagram 2

Flow diagram of how diesel fuel (ADO) is apparently sold
by Mobil (South Africa) to Genta

     As with gasoline, the method whereby diesel fuel was imported into Rhodesia was rendered considerably more spohisticated from September 1968. Again, most of Rhodesia's requirements were provided by Mobil (South Africa), and Minerals Exploration was the key link between them and Genta. The middlemen between Mobil (South Africa) and Minerals Exploration (see diagram 2) were the bogus companies Rand Oils and W.T. Development, plus two more (probably bogus) called Botswana Carriers and Botswana Transport. Plus there is a third whose name we do not know but we will call it company X. The payment procedures and the use of copy invoices were the same as for gasoline importation.

     However, by 1971, the procedure had been somewhat simplified in that the number of middlemen between Mobil (South Africa) and Minerals Exploration were reduced to one, namely the Motor and Industrial Transport Corporation, a subsidiary of a large South African company called Bonuskor Ltd. When Mobil (South Africa) sent an invoice to Motor and Industrial, they sent it not to their official address, but to Box 31883 in Braamfontein - which happens to be the address of Minerals Exploration, itself a front for Freight Services Ltd. Thus there was no need for Motor and Industrial to make out an invoice to Minerals Exploration; the3 Freight Services employee who handled the mail coming into Box 31883 opened the letters containing invoices addressed to Motor and Industrial, and then made out similar invoices to Genta on Minerals Exploration paper as before. 


     This, again, was imported by Genta from Mobil (South Africa), who provided all of Rhodesia's requirements. This time the paper-chase was relatively simple: Freight Services bought the Avtur from Mobil (South Africa) and sold it directly to Genta.


     This was imported in two ways, according to the type of Avgas. All Rhodesia's requirements of Avgas 100/130 were imported by Genta from Shell (South Africa). Avgas 115/145 and Avgas 80 were imported by Genta from Mobil (South Africa). using two alternative middlemen: Trek (a haulage company, not the better known Trek Petroleum Company) and Caritas (a firm of clearing agents).

     When Mobil (Rhodesia), acting for Agenta, ordered Avgas 115/145 by telex from Mobil (South Africa), the code word "pine apples" was used; and the word "paw paws" was used for Avtur. 


     Mobil has used the paper-chase concept for importing into Rhodesia various non-fuel products such as lubricants. Different intermediaries were used for different products, just as with fuels. Again, as with fuels, the Mobil refinery in South Africa was almost almost always the source of the products. But with these non-fuel products, Genta did not feature in the buying chain; as has already been stated, Genta left it to the various oil companies to arrange their own importation of these products.

     Some of the methods used by Mobil for importing non -fuel products are described in section 5.5 below. 


The evidence


     One way in which Mobil and other oil companies in Southern Africa have been protected from being exposed as sanctions-busters, is that anything to do with with oil in Rhodesia is covered by the Official Secrets Act. The secrecy surrounding the oil industry is almost as intense as in South Africa. But the oil companies have also been protected, as intended, by the sophistication of their importation scheme. Firstly, it is a scheme in which very few people indeed knew exactly what was happening, without necessarily knowing the names of the companies involved. Secondly, even for those who do have a good idea of what is happening, it is impossible to prove unless documentary can be produced. And the very essence of the scheme is that hardly any incriminating documents get created. For if the scheme is that company A sell oil to company B, who sell it to company C, who sell it to company D, then there is no single document that proves that company A intended it to be sold to company D.       

     Okhela has informed the Centre for Social Action of the United Church of Christ that this problem became very clear to them after their investigations reached a certain stage. The public would only be convinced of what they had discovered if they could obtain documentation which conclusively proved what is happening. But it is already clear that the only incriminating documents that would exist was of two types:
  • Letters which short-circuited the carefully planned paper-chase, thereby proving that there was a business relationship between, say, Mobil (South Africa) and Rand Oils Ltd.      
  • Secret policy documents, in which the whole context of the oil operation was explained to the very people who needed to know it.  
     Fortunately Okhela has succeeded in obtaining both types of documents. These documents have been passed on to the Centre for Social Action together with additional information. 

     In this report the Centre for Social Action of the United Church of Christ is publishing over 30 pages of documentation, omitting only a few pages which it has. It seems worthwhile at this stage to quote a few of the more incriminating paragraphs from these documents.


  • From Genta to the managing director of Mobil Rhodesia:                                                          " . . . . we attach a statement detailing estimated requirements of Petroleum Fuels for the period January/April 1974 (. . .) we shall be obliged if you will pass this information to your associate Mobil (South Africa)".                                                                                                                                                                 (Quote taken from Document # 1; see Section5.4                                                                                 

  • From Mobil (South Africa) to Mobil (Rhodesia):                                                             ". . . "we should be able to supply your initial requirement [of Hexane] without too much trouble. (. . .) I think you can tell Rhodesian Industries that we will be able to supply them during 1974 . . . "                                 (Quote taken from Document #2,  see section 5.4) 

  • From Mobil (Rhodesia) to Mobil (South Africa), concerning the flow diagram for the paper-chase for importing diesel fuel (diagram 2):                                                                           "The important feature of this plan is that original billings by MOSA [(Mobil South Africa)] to the two or three organizations in the top line and the subsequent re-billing to the second line and ultimately the the third re-billing by the second line to the third line are, to all intents and purposes, meaningless and are merely our false trail being laid . . . . "    "You might consider that the procedure that we have adopted is unduly complicated and unnecessary, but as was conveyed to you when you were here, it is the wish of George's people [a reference to Genta, whose Chairman is George Atmore] that we involve and complicate this matter to a far greater degree than pertains at present in the hope that it will discourage an investigation"                                                                                                                                                             (Quote taken from Document #16; see appendix)
  • From an internal Mobil (Rhodesia) report:                                                                               
"When orders for lubricants and solvents are placed on our South African associates [i.e. Mobil (South Africa)], a carefully planned paper-chase is used to disguise the final destination of the products. This is necessary in order to make sure that there is no link between MOSA's [Mobil (South Africa)] supplies. .”  
"This paper-chase which costs very little, is primarily to hide the fact that MOSA is in fact supplying MOSR with product in contravention of U.S. Sanctions regulations . . .
"Genta allocates to Mobil the importation of  Premium, Regular, ADO [Diesel fuel] and Avtur [aviation turbine fuel]. Avtur is imported on behalf of Industry despite frequent attempt by Shell to stop this . . . . While Mobil imports Avtur, other companies import kerosene, Avgas etc . . ."    (Quotes taken from Document #17; see Appendix)    
  • From another internal Mobil (Rhodesia) report:                                                                   
"With U.D.I., it became necessary to impose certain security restrictions so as not to link Mobil (South Africa) with Mobil (Rhodesia). The East Coast route [i.e. by ship from South Africa to Mozambique, and thence by rail to Rhodesia] was, therefore, overlooked for the following reasons:  (. . .) With the East Coast under heavy surveillance it was considered undesirable to have Mobil drums stacked at Mozambican ports, even though the names on the drums had been painted out" (Quote taken from Document #18; see appendix)                     

     A number of documents are reproduced in full over the next few pages. Three of the longer and more detailed ones, all highly secret, are shown in the Appendix.

Above: A Mobil Petrol Station in Salisbury

Document # 1

     Document #1 is a letter from D. Airey, who is Operations Manager of Genta, the semi-secret Rhodesian government agency controlling fuel imports. It is addressed to Berwick Nicol, Managing Director of Mobil (Rhodesia). 

     Every four months, Genta instructs Mobil (Rhodesia) to arrange the importation to Rhodesia of specific quantities of Premium gasoline, Regular gasoline, Diesel fuel, and Avtur (Aviation turbine fuel), to come from the Mobil refinery in South Africa, via the paper-chase referred tol in sections 4.5 and 4.6.    

     The "Mr. Atmore" referred to is George Atmore, Chairman of Genta. The "visit to Cape Town" refers to visting the head office of Mobil (South Africa). "Your associates" refers to Mobil (South Africa). The identity of Genta's "Agents in Lourenzo Marques" is not known; it could be the Lourenzo Marques branch of Freight Services Ltd. The reference to Lourenzo Marques makes it fairly clear that this fuel was intended to come via Lourenzo Marques on its way from South Africa to Rhodesia. 

     Further analysis of the qwuantities specified is given in Section 5.8. The fact that Mobil was not asked to import any Regular gasoline at this time suggests that Rhodesian reserves were already considered adequate; or possibly that for a while all importation of Regular was being carried out by another company. 


     Document # 2 is a  letter from M.H.W. Gubb of Mobil (South Africa), to Bill Jackson of Mobil (Rhodesia). One thing that Bill Beck, Chairman of Mobil (South Africa), apparently insists on is that when correspondence takes place between Mobil (South Africa and Mobil (Rhodesia) on the question of supply of oil products from the former to the latter, people should write on a personal basis. Thus the letter head used here gives only the P.O. Box number of Mobil (South Africa), and the letter is addressed to Jackson personally, rather than to his department or company. Sometimes letters and phone calls between the two subsidiaries are sent to home addresses rather than to office addresses. 

     This letter, which is only shown in part because of a shortage of space, concerns detailed detailed aspects of the supply to Rhodesia of certain solvents. The quantity "metton" referred to is the metric ton. Note the marked sections, including (a) the crucial reference to supplying Mobil (Rhodesia) with some Hexane apparently originating in the U.S.A.; (b) the reference to the possibility of an embargo being imposed by the American government on oil exports from the USA to South Africa, or by the South African government on Rhodesia. 

     In Document # 16 (see Appendix), there is a letter going the other way, i.e. from Mobil (Rhodesia) to Mobil (South Africa). Thus we have documentary evidence of a two-way correspondence between subsidiaries of Mobil concerning the exportation of oil products to Rhodesia by Mobil (South Africa).



     As has already been made clear, Genta does not involve itself in the importation into Rhodesia of non-fuel oil products. Subject to limitations of foreign exchange, the oil companies in Rhodesia make their own arrangements for importing these products.

     There are a large number of different products under this category. When Mobil (South Africa) and occasionally other sources are used, they tend to use a Mobil (Rhodesia)’s import paper-chase as applicable for each product. Summarized details on these different methods are given in Document # 17(see Appendix). Section IX of that report deals with the importation of lubricants and greases. This is also covered under in Document # 16 (see Appendix). The paper-chase used until recently for these two products is particularly interesting, and is explained in the flow diagram in Document #3. (That document was originally appended to the report in Document #17.

     The paper-chase for lubricants and greases was remarkable in that it made use of no fewer than six bogus organizations. These are:

·         Semco No. 3 Account, of P.O. Box 442, Durban. This is similarly named to a legitimate company called Semco Lubricants and Chemicals (Pty) Ltd, which is part of Chemico (Pty) Ltd. Chemico is a wholly owned subsidiary of Trek Beleggings Ltd., which itself is 17.5 per cent owned by Shell (South Africa), and 17.5 per cent owned by BP (South Africa). But in their letter in document # 16, Mobil (Rhodesia) says, “We have obtained Semco’s agreement to our opening a number 3 account in their name at the address of their attorneys. . . “The attorneys in question are Mooney, Ford and Partners of P.O. Box 442, Durban. The man handling the bogus Semco account on behalf of Mobil was Mr Dugmore.

·         Rand Oils Ltd. operated by David Patrick from P.O. Box 2581 Johannesburg.

·         Western Transvaal Development and Exploration Co. operated by the lawyer A.J. Oberholzer from P.O. Box 396, Lichtenburg.

·         Minerals Exploration Ltd., a front for Freight Services Ltd. Operated from P.O. Box 31883, Braamfontein. (This organization and the previous two have already been mentioned in connection with the role they play in gasoline and diesel paper-chases).

·         Village Main Distribution, operated by Mrs Anne Beard from P.O. Box 67324, Bryanston, Transvaal.

·         Recom of Rhodesia Ltd., a front company for Mobil (Rhodesia) operated out of Box ST39, Southerton Salisbury, Rhodesia.

     The paper-chases illustrated in Document #3 worked as follows: on receiving requests for lubricants and greases from Mobil (Rhodesia), Mobil (South Africa) sold them what looked like a frequent customer, namely, Semco No 3 Account over which the legitimate Semco had no control. But in fact they were sold to something quite different. Instead it was controlled by the attorney, Mr Dugmore. He then sold the consignment in rotation to Rand Oils, Village Main Distributors, and W.T. Development; each then sold them to another middleman (see flow diagram in Document # 3), who sold them to Recom of Rhodesia which was a front for Mobil (Rhodesia). The general concept is very similar to that of the paper-chases already described in more detail.

     In fact the procedure described above is the third of four procedures that have been used over the years. The first method, used until August 12968, was for Mobil (South Africa) to sell to the legitimate Semco, who sold direct to Recom of Rhodesia, fronting for Mobil (Rhodesia). This was changed partly because Genta insisted that more sophisticated methods be used because there were accounting problems involved in using the legitimate Semco (see Document # 16) The second method used was as described in Document # 3, except that that payment went from Mobil (Rhodesia) to Semco No. 3 Account went via Minerals Exploration rather than direct. This was replaced in about 1970 with the method shown in Document 3. Then, finally, in early 1975, a completely new method was made use of which is described later in section 6.2.            



     So far as outward appearances were concerned, the “middlemen” such as Rand Oils (see Document #3) had nothing to do with Mobil (Rhodesia), and there should be no reason for any contact between them and Mobil in Rhodesia or South Africa. Such contact only took place when something went wrong – and the contact provides highly incrimination evidence.

     From September 1968, David Patrick operated a bogus “Rand Oils” as part of the paper-chase for lubricants described above in 5.5. On 21 September 1968 he wrote to Peter Faure, of Mobil (Rhodesia), enclosing some invoices. His note, shown in Document # 4, was querying whether these invoices for lubricants, made out to Rand Oils by Semco No. 3 Account, should be re-invoiced by him to Village Main Distributors. The “Richard” referred to is Richard van Niekerk, author of the Document # 16.  

     Faure replied on 30th September saying that Patrick was right, and that van Niekerk had given confusing instructions. He added, “I . . . attach . . . the invoices for your onward transmission to Village Main Distributors”. In other words, Faure was sending back to Mr Patrick some invoices made out by Semco Nr. 3 Account from Rand Oils to Village Main Distributors. Eventually, Faure received invoices for the same lubricants, made out this time by Minerals Exploration to Recom of Rhodesia.  

     On October 18th 1972, Anne Beard, who operated “Main Village Distributors” as part of the lubricants paper-chase, wrote to Stephen Phear of Mobil (Rhodesia) – an organization with which she officially had no connection. She said that she had run out of blank “Village Main Distributors” invoices, and would be glad if he could arrange to have some printed for her. (This, if nothing else, helps to prove that Village Main was not a real company). Tony Bates acting on behalf of Phear then wrote on October 25th to Mr Meier, one of the two contact people at Freight Services Ltd, that are mentioned in the list of contacts in Document # 17. He passed on to Meier the request to get the Village Main invoices printed. On October 31st A R Morris, of Freight Services replied to Bates with the letter shown in Document # 5. He agreed to provide Mrs Beard with her invoice forms, but he went on to criticise Bates for dealing with the wrong person at Freight Services. Morris was Manager of the Foreign Trade Division which is a senior position. It seems clear that very few people at Freight Services were allowed to know about the involvement with Mobil.

     Mrs Beard had run out of invoices again by October 1973, as her letter in Document 3 6 indicates.

     These letters suggest the existence of highly irregular links between Freight Services, Mobil (Rhodesia), Rand Oils, and Village Main Distributors. 


     The paper-chase used for solvents such as Pegasol-3040 operates as follows: Mobil (South Africa) first sell it to “Plascon Evans Paints Natal Ltd Non. Rep. No. 3 Account”, operating from P.O. Box 442, Durban. Plascon Evans Paints is a large and well-known firm which can often be expected to buy solvents in large quantities. But Plascon Evans No. 3 Account is nothing to do with the legitimate Plascon Evans Company; it is operated on behalf of Mobil by its attorneys Mooney Ford and Partners, whose address is P.O. Box 442 Durban. (It will be remembered that the same attorneys operate the Semco No. 3 Account, as part of the lubricants paper-chase).

     On receiving the invoices made out to Plascon Evans Nr. 3 Account, Mr Dugmore in the attorneys’ office takes out a blank “Minerals Exploration” invoice, and uses it to “sell” the same product to “Recom of Rhodesia”, which of course is a front for Mobil (Rhodesia). The latter then collect that invoice from P.O. Box ST39, Southerton, in Salisbury.

     Shown in Document # 7 is an advise note (similar but not identical to an invoice) for a consignment of 36,746 litres of Pegasol-3040 sent by Mobil (South Africa) to Plascon Evans No. 3 Account on August 7th 1973; the price is 1,260 Rands on the invoice number 134977. On receiving this, a Mineral Exploration invoice was made out giving not only the same details, price and also the same date and invoice number.  This invoice is shown in Document # 8.


     The information given in the top two tables of Document # 9 represents an important Rhodesian state secret. The first table shows how Rhodesia’s total consumption of gasoline (Premium plus Regular) has changed over the years since UDI. The “general trade” column refers to gasoline sold through normal retail outlets. The “Contract Trade” column refers to bulk orders of gasoline sold by contract. The “Total Trade” is the sum of these two.

     Thus at the time of UDI, when there were no political problems involved in importing fuel, Rhodesia consumed 1,407,000 barrels of gasoline, or about 165,000 tons. Two years later, consumption was only 20% down, despite rigorous sanctions. By 1974 (the year after this summary was written in Mobil (Rhodesia)’s head office, gasoline consumption was anticipated to be 1,939,000 barrels (about 230,000 tons), 38% above the UDI level.

     The equivalent figures for Rhodesian consumption of diesel fuel (A.D.O.), shown in the second table, are as follows: 1965 1,197,000 barrels ((about 140,000 tons); 1967, 14% down; 1974 planned level 1,869,000 barrels (about 220,000 tons), that is 38% above UDI level.

     We know from the Genta letter to Mobil shown in Document # 1, that Genta estimated that it would require Mobil (South Africa) to provide Rhodesia with 26,420 cubic meters of diesel fuel during the first four months of 1974. This is 26 per cent of Rhodesia’s planned consumption of diesel fuel for 1974. That is roughly equivalent to an annual provision of 500,000 barrels. During at least the late sixties, Mobil provided most of Rhodesia’s consumption of diesel, Regular, Premium and Avtur. But by the early seventies, the other oil companies – not just Mobil – were exporting fuel from South Africa to Rhodesia. That is why Mobil provided only about a quarter of Rhodesia’s diesel needs in 1974.

     The third table in Document # 9 shows how Mobil’s market share within Rhodesia has varied since UDI for the five different fuel products. In 1972, for instance, Mobil (Rhodesia) sold 18.4 percent of the diesel in Rhodesia. It is very important to appreciate that this does not mean that Mobil imported 18.4 percent of gasoline imported in 1972. Genta makes its own arrangements for the importation of fuels; Genta then sells to the five oil companies in Rhodesia the fuel which it has imported, for them to retail throughout the country. The third table thus refers to Mobil’s market share of what was sold inside Rhodesia, and does not tell us how much Mobil has imported.

     We know from Document # 9 that the projected Rhodesian consumption of gasoline in 1973 was 1,873,000 barrels, of which Mobil expected to sell 18.3 percent, or 343,000 barrels. Likewise, Mobil’s projected 1973 sale of diesel fuel was 22.9 percent of 1,738,000 barrels, i.e. 398,000 barrels. The two together total 741,000 barrels. We do not know what Mobil’s sales were that year for other fuel and non-fuel products, but we can calculate it from the fact that Document # 12 shows Mobil’s projected 1973 sales within Rhodesia of all products was 942,000 barrels. Thus it is possible to derive the following table:

Mobil’s projected 1973 sales within Rhodesia:
Gasoline               – 343,000 barrels
Diesel                   – 398,000 barrels
All other products – 201,000 barrels
TOTAL sales        - 942,000 barrels

     Again it should be emphasized that these figures represent Mobil’s sales within Rhodesia, not its imports into Rhodesia. 
     The table in Document # 10, taken from a different Mobil (Rhodesia) report, shows Mobil’s estimate of how shares in the gasoline market have varied for from 1967 to 1972 for the five oil companies in Rhodesia (Mobil, Shell, Caltex, BP and Total). In 1972 Mobil had had 18.4 percent of the gasoline market, Shell had 35.8 percent and so on. Shell is by far the largest oil company in Rhodesia. 


     Document # 11 is part of a 1973 Mobil (Rhodesia) report. Paragraph four is very important. It suggests that there was a direct payment from Mobil (Rhodesia) to Mobil South Africa, which would be a particularly blatant evasion of sanctions regulations. This payment was for the relatively insignificant sum of 140,000 Rhodesian dollars and was to pay items such as the use of the Mobil (South Africa) computer and a share of the costs of developing certain Mobil graphics.

     Much larger sums of money were of course paid by Mobil (Rhodesia) and by Genta to Mobil (South Africa) via the intermediaries made use of in the various paper-chases. It is possible to calculate roughly how much Genta paid Mobil (South Africa) in 1974 as follows. Document # 1shows that Mobil (South Africa) provided the following for Genta during the first four months of 1974: 16,500,000 litres of Premium, 26,420,000 litres of diesel and 9,400,000 of Avtur. One of the documents that CSA is not including in this report for reasons of space shows that at about the time the price charged in Rhodesia was: Premium – 15.39 cents per litre; Diesel - 11.55 cents per litre; Avtur – 13.67 cents per litre. (By the time these were sold at the pumps, however, profit margins and duties added the prices of Premium and diesel were 30.09 and 18.40 US cents per litre respectively.) Estimating that Genta charged the oil in Rhodesia, before duty, about 10 percent more than they paid Mobil (South Africa) for the imports, and assuming that importation rates and prices remained steady during 1974, we find that during that year, the sum of money paid via intermediaries by Genta to Mobil (South Africa) for fuel products was about US $ 18.6 million.
In addition, Mobil (South Africa) sold a range of non-fuel products without going through Genta. We cannot calculate the value of these, but it seems fair to estimate that in 1974 Mobil (South Africa) apparently provided oil products for Rhodesia worth at least US $ 20 million.


     Documents # 12, # 13, and # 14 provide a wealth of financial and other detail that we can hardly begin to analyse in the space available. All these documents are extremely confidential internal reports.

     A key is given below to explain some of the terms and symbols. Document # 12 summarises how Mobil (Rhodesia)’s performance improved between UDI and 1973. During eight years of sanctions, Mobil’s operations in Rhodesia went from reasonably profitable to highly profitable. For instance:

·         After-tax return on investment rose steadily from 9.8 % to 18.3 %;

·         After-tax profit per barrel tripled, while marketing expense per barrel remained steady;

·         Sales rose from 763,000 barrels to 965,000 barrels;

·         The value of sales doubled, from US $ 12.8 million to US $ 24.8 million;

·         The cash position went from a deficit of nearly a US $ million, to a surplus of US $ 2.3 million.

     Document # 13 is a summary of the December 1972 profit figures for five Mobil subsidiaries: Mobil (South Africa), Mobil (Rhodesia), the Mobil refinery in Durban, and the Westchester Insurance Company (Pvt) Ltd. The particular value of the document is that it gives cumulative figures, so it is possible to obtain annual figures entitled “Cumulative Reports”.

     The figures are in thousands US dollars; so from the row “P.B.T.” (profit before tax) in the MOSR section, it is possible to see that Mobil (Rhodesia)’s pre-tax profit in 1972 was $ 1.614 million. (This varies somewhat from the figure in the later dated Document # 12, because certain outstanding debits and credits had not been taken into account when Document # 13 was compiled.)

     The row entitled “New York Profit” probably refers to the profit figure that was reported to the New York head office of Mobil; the fact that such a figure was reported for Mobil (Rhodesia)’s operations suggests that the head office was at least given a reasonable amount of information of the Rhodesian subsidiary. This conflicts with the claims of many European and American companies, with subsidiaries in Rhodesia, who state that because of UDI, they have no control over the activities of these subsidiaries and receive no information concerning their operations.

     Document # 14 is a simple financial report for 1973, although it is constructed slightly differently. By comparing these two tables, it is possible to see that between 1972 and 1973 profits rose with Mobil (Rhodesia) from $ 1.6 million to $ 13.2; Mobil (South Africa) from $ 13.2 million to $ 37.7 million; Mobil Refinery from $ 9.7 million to $ 26.3 million. The increases were remarkable, though much of it could represent the increase in value of fuel stocks caused by the “oil crisis” rise in prices.


$ ‘000
Thousands US Dollars
BBL ‘000
Thousands of barrels
Projected figures (a year not yet completed)
Difference between reported figure and planned figure
P and (L)
Profit and loss
Management information services




     Most of the documentation presented in this report relates to the activities of Mobil, although there are certain references to other oil companies. Shell, for instance, imports al of Rhodesia’s Avgas 100/130, which is made considerable use of by Rhodesia’s Air Force.

     Okhela has passed over to the CSA some of the results of its investigations into companies other than Mobil. These suggest that after the years when Mobil was importing most of the principal oil products (gasoline, diesel, Avtur) into Rhodesia, the other companies became more involved in the early seventies. This was in addition to their on going activities in the importation of non-fuel products. 
Furthermore, it seems that all of the companies of interest (Mobil, Caltex, BP, and Total) are still importing oil products right up to this very month.  

    We have been particularly well-informed on the role of Shell. When Shell (South Africa) plans their future sales, they include in their planning tables a special category enigmatically entitled ‘FS’. This stands for Freight Services Ltd. – a name that we have become familiar – and is to cover purchases by Freight Services for subsequent sale resale to or in Mozambique, Malawi – and Rhodesia.

     In supplying oil products in Rhodesia, Shell operates through Freight Services and five other middlemen. This system has been operating a several years. Every three months Freight Services, acting on behalf of themselves and the other middlemen, send to Shell their requirements for a variet5y of oil products, specifying how much they estimate will be needed over the next 3 and 12 months. Their requirements for Rhodesia have averaged a fairly steady rate over the years.

     The Shell companies in Southern Africa are subsidiaries of Royal-Dutch Shell, which is 40% British. Informed sources say the British government is quite aware of the fact that Shell (South Africa) is providing oil products to Rhodesia. But nothing has been done about this.

     Shell has also been involved in a fascinating development in Rhodesia itself. Shell (Rhodesia) has built a lubricating blending plant at Willwvale, an industrial site in Salisbury. They import rail-wagons full of what is called ‘base stock’ – semi-processed crude – together with certain key additives. The base stock comes from South Africa, all or nearly all from the Rhodesia refinery there. The stock is then mixed with additives at the blending plant, to produce a variety of lubricants for road vehicles, factory machinery etcetera.

     The plant started operating in late 1974, and provided all of Shell’s needs in Rhodesia. But there was still spare capacity available at the plant, and from early 1975 the plant has also been used to blend lubricants according to Shell specifications, which is then pout into cans marked with the trademarks of Mobil, Caltex, Total, and BP. This process is cheaper than importing all the different companies’ lubricants in cans or drums from South Africa, and saves on foreign exchange. For this reason the Rhodesian government has forbidden the importation of lubricants, and the companies have had no option but go along with this scheme. This probably makes Rhodesia the only country in the world where unsuspecting motorists, responding to sophisticated advertisements, can go and buy their favourite lubricant, only to end up pouring the same Shell product into their engines. 



    The map below shows the different routes which have been available at different times for importation of Rhodesia’s oil.

     Immediately after UDI, road transport was used to cross the South African-Rhodesian border at Beit Bridge. But as explained in section 4.1, road transport is an expensive way of bringing in most oil products. The most economic route used to be to take the products by ship from South Africa to Lourenzo Marques in Mozambique, and then take them by train to Rhodesia. Sometimes the stage from South Africa to Lourenzo Marques was done by train. Occasionally, oil products were taken to Beira by ship either from South Africa (this was unusual) or from the Persian Gulf. From Beira they were taken by rail to Umtali in Rhodesia, and usually on to Salisbury. However the Frelimo government in Mozambique imposed sanctions, and closed its border with Rhodesia thereby ending Rhodesia’s use of these routes.

     Until shortly before that time, the only other rail route from South Africa to Rhodesia involved going through Botswana, which was a particularly circuitous route for products from the two refineries in Durban. But in September 1974, a single track rail link was completed in Rhodesia between Beit Bridge and Rutenga, making it possible for the first time for trains to cross straight from South Africa to inland Rhodesia.

     This is now the most economical route for sanctions-busting traffic. However, there is still a 
transportation problem for Rhodesia’s minority government: the railway system in South Africa is under government control and does not have much slack capacity. If Vorster should want to force Smith to respond more to his will, he only has to say that the South African Railways is over burdened, and might not in future be able to carry all of Rhodesia’s requirements – especially exports which are bulkier than its imports.

     The documents which we have shown do not specify which of the above routes was used for principal products, although Document # 18 (see appendix) does discuss the routing of some Mobil (Rhodesia) normal imports. In fact, the route used for most fuel imports before Mozambican independence, was via Lourenzo Marques. According to Document # 9, Rhodesia’s projected consumption of gasoline was 1,873,000 barrels, and for diesel fuel was 1,738,000 barrels. These two total approximately 425,000 tons. Assuming that Rhodesian total importation rate was approximately equal at that time and that gasoline and diesel between them constituted two thirds of Rhodesia’s total consumption of fuel product we find that Rhodesia imported approximately 650,000 tons of fuel products in 1973.

     According to information given in the Observer (London) on 14 March 1976, the total quantity of oil products carried by rail from Lourenzo Marques to Rhodesia in 1973 was 589,000 tons. Our figures strongly suggest that this flow constituted the great majority of Rhodesia’s fuel imports at that time.        

    The tanker 'Mobil Durban' unloading fuel at Lourenzo Marques, Mozambique, in the fall of 1974. (Note the 'Mobil' sign on the ship's funnel. Most fuel unloaded here comes from South Africa and was destined for Rhodesia.

    Moving 50 yards further back from the 'Mobil Durban', we see the entrance to a Freight Services Ltd. 'tank farm' on the left. 

     Moving further back from the 'Mobil Durban' see also a wagon belonging to Rhodesian Railways (note the sign 'R.R.) waiting to pick up sanctions evading imports.    

     Below we see an unmarked railway wagon at Lourenzo Marques in the fall of 1974. The documentation carried on the wagon found in a small box under the number '474225' 

     In the small box was found this card, revealing that the wagon contained 40777 litres of premium gasoline. Nothing indicated to whom the gasoline belonged of where it was destined for. However, the fact that this card was in English rather than Portuguese suggests that the gasoline was destined for South Africa or Rhodesia.

     More modern fuel wagons, again unloading at the 'tank farms' belonging to Total, in Salisbury. Note the similarity between these wagons and the one photographed at Lourenzo Marques.    
     More modern fuel wagons, again unloading in Total storage tanks in Salisbury. Note the signs in English and Portuguese, making it clear that the wagons frequently go through Mozambique. 
      A Freight Services Ltd. storage depot in Salisbury, Rhodesia.



     We have already shown how Freight Services Ltd., one of South Africa’s largest shipping and forwarding  companies, plays a central role in arranging exportation to Rhodesia of oil products provided by Mobil (South Africa). Usually hiding behind the name “Minerals Exploration Ltd.”, it is the only intermediary company to appear in practically all of Mobil’s paper-chases. It also acts as a sort of coordinator of other intermediary companies, arranging to do things like printing bogus invoice forms for them. Finally, it is one of the few intermediaries which are entrusted with handling the money, not just the invoices. And the quantities it deals with are impressive: the value of the oil products it buys and sells for Mobil each year would seem to run into tens of millions of dollars.

     We have also shown that Freight Services plays a similar role for Shell, handling all their oil supplies for Rhodesia, and coordinating intermediaries.

     But we can go further. We showed in the previous chapter how the great majority of Rhodesia’s fuel supplies were sent from South Africa via Mozambique, prior to Mozambican independence. And investigations in Mozambique around that time suggested that all the oil supplies going up the railway line from Lourenzo Marques to Rhodesia were handled by Freight Services. For instance, 83 fuel-filled railway wagons went up the line on the 23rd October 1974; and the fuel in every one of them belonged to Freight Services, according to the files in an appropriate railway office.

     Given that Freight Services seem to have been the intermediary used for all the oil supplies sent to Rhodesia via Mozambique, and given that Freight Services handled all the Mobil and Shell oil products sent to Rhodesia, we have to conclude that Freight Services were also the principal intermediary used by Caltex, Total and BP when they sent their own sanctions-busting oil products to Rhodesia.

     This leads one to ask who owns Freight Services Ltd. It turns out that before July 1975, 22.9 percent of the Freight Services shares were owned by Charter Consolidated Ltd., (a British company which is part of the huge Anglo American empire. 56 percent of the shares were owned by the Anglo American Industrial Corporation Ltd. Thus the Anglo American ‘Empire’ headed by Harry Oppenheimer, held almost 90 percent of the shares in a company which has, in great secrecy, acted as a crucial facilitator in enabling the oil companies to evade sanctions and provide the Smith regime with its life blood.

     In July 1975 the Freight Services parent company, Freight Services Holdings Ltd., was merged with two other companies to form Aero Marine Freight Services Holdings Ltd. Control of this larger company is jointly exercised by the Anglo American Investment (Safmarine).  At around that time a new director was appointed to the board of Safmarine, namely William Francis de la Harpe Beck – who is also the Chairman and Managing Director of Mobil (South Africa), and Chairman of Mobil (Rhodesia) . . . . .This caused quite a stir. It was apparently the first time that a head of a Mobil subsidiary had joined a company outside of the Mobil empire. It was alleged by some that there was a conflict of interest; Safmarine buys vast quantities of bunker fuel for its ships, and Mobil competes with others to provide it.

     But what was not publicly appreciated at the time was a much more subtle irony, that Mr Beck was and is not only Chairman of both Mobil (South Africa) and Mobil (Rhodesia), but he is also on the board of the company which jointly controls Freight Services, which is the company that enables him to evade sanctions and get oil products from the one company he chairs to the other one.

     Above: An advertisement for Freight Services Ltd., from the Rhodesian Business Herald, 24 July 1975. Note the reference to their ability to 'store freight' in tank farms. There are not many commodities other than oil products that one needs to store on tank farms . . . As for the final question: "Is there any freight service we don't supply?"; the answer would appear, from the evidence contained in this report, to be NO!


    We do not attempt to carry out a definitive interpretation of the law as it applies to sanctions; we leave that to Mobil’s Chairman, whom we have already quoted. The main purpose of this report is to present the facts, so that others can take them up and make use of them.

     It will be noted that subsidiaries of U.S. corporations which are not organized under the laws of Rhodesia or which have their principal place of business outside Rhodesia – for example South Africa – are not listed as “included” in the Administrative Executive Order of the U.S. regulating sanctions against Rhodesia. This constitutes a major apparent loophole which is not found in parallel regulations in trading with “enemies”. However, the sanctions regulations do cover Rhodesian subsidiaries, and goods of U.S. origin as well as U.S citizens. The Mobil case would seem to involve all of these. It must be presumed that Mobil (U.S.A.) and/or its officers and managers had reason to know of the activities of the activities which Mobil (Rhodesia) was carrying on with Mobil’s South African subsidiary.

·         Everett S. Charles is an American citizen. He is a member of the board of directors of Mobil (South Africa). He is also Executive vice-president (second only to the President) of the International Division of Mobil Oil Corporation, which owns Mobil (South Africa). One of the countries he is responsible for within the Mobil empire is South Africa. It is to him that that William Beck, Chairman of Mobil (South Africa) has to report.

     In November 1975, the Chairman of Mobil of Mobil wrote a the letter that we have quoted, in which he said, “The management of our International Division has gone to considerable effort to make sure that we have fully complied with the restrictions imposed upon us by the U.S. government [in connection with sanctions regulations]”.

·         Charles E. Solomon is an American citizen. At the time when almost all of the documents we have quoted in this report were written he was a member of the board of Mobil (South Africa).He was also President of the International Division of Mobil Oil Corporation, and is a member of its board.

·         Faneuil Adams Jr. is an American citizen. He is Vice President of the Planning and International Division of Mobil Oil Corporation. From 1972 to 1975 he was President of Mobil South Inc. At that time he was also on the board of Mobil (South Africa), and it was to him that William Beck then reported.

     It is hard to imagine that sanctions-breaking activities by Mobil (South Africa) were unknown to its board; after all, they involved business worth tens of millions of dollars, which would normally be reported on and evaluated at board meetings. And with these three U.S. citizens who are or have been directors of Mobil (South Africa) and very senior executives within Mobil (U.S.A.), it is difficult to see how Mobil (U.S.A.) could be said to know nothing of the sanctions-breaking activities of its subsidiary.

     Oil is the one import without which the white minority regime in Rhodesia would be unable to survive. The material presented in this report. Concerning the means whereby Rhodesia’s oil needs have been provided, reveals the existence of a Southern African Corporate Watergate.
     The involvement in this whole operation by subsidiaries of Mobil, one of the ten largest corporations, completely undermines Dr Kissinger’s stated commitment to the enforcement of United Nations sanctions as a means of bringing about majority rule in Rhodesia.



A. List of Personalities mentioned in the documents

B. Document # 15

C. Document16
(Letter from Richard van Niekerk of Mobil (Rhodesia) to R.H Maskew of Mobil (South Africa)

C. Document # 17
Mobil (Rhodesia) Memorandum describing importation paper-chases

 D. Document 18
Mobil Rhodesia Memorandum concerning paper-chases - selected pages only

E. Document # 18