Sanctions against Rhodesia: Diplomatic Farce, or Economic and Legal Means to raise moral and material support for the Southern African Liberation Movements
Papers delivered at the seminar on Sanctions on Rhodesia held in Amsterdam
29th and 30th November 1974 at the Municipal University o
f Amsterdam. The report contains all the papers presented for discussion by the
liberation movements of Zimbabwe, the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and
the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU), Anti Apartheid and other experts,
with summaries, discussion of papers presented and conclusions for a way forward during a final plenary
session.
Table of
Contents
1.
Opening Welcome and Introductory Remarks by the Seminar Chairperson,
Berend Schuitema,
General Secretary of the Dutch AAM 2
2.
The Significance of the Sanctions Campaign for the Liberation
Movement
By Philemon
Makonese, ZAPU 4
3.
Armed Struggle of the People of Zimbabwe
By TJP
Jokonya, (ZANU) 9
4.
Recent Developments in Mozambique and South Africa and their
implications for the struggle of the Zimbabwe People,
By John Sprack
and Mike Terry, British AAM. 14
5.
The United Nations and Sanctions Policy on Rhodesia,
By Abdul
Minty, Honorary Secretary of the British AAM. 21
6.
The Significance and Legal Implications of the Sanctions
Campaign for Progressive Movements in Western Countries,
By Annemieke
Gerritsma, Sanctions Task Team Dutch Anti apartheid Movement. 25
7.
ICFTU Involvement with Sanctions and Trade Union Rights in
Rhodesia
By Mr. Andrew
M. Kailembo 35
8.
Final Plenary Session 38
9.
Press Release - Joint Statement by ZANU and ZAPU 42
10.
Closing speech by Mr. Relus ter Beek (MP) Dutch Labour Party. 43
Appendices:
A.
United Nations Security Council Resolution 217 (1965) http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/222/88/IMG/NR022288.pdf?OpenElement
B.
United Nations Security Council Resolution 253 (1968) http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/248/34/IMG/NR024834.pdf?OpenElement
C.
United Nations Security Council Resolution 333 (1973)
Organized jointly by the Dutch AAM and the Transnational
Institute
1.
Opening, Welcome and
Introductory Remarks
A
good cold morning
to all of you!
Welcome and thank you for having made
yourselves available for these two days to participate in this seminal event on
Sanctions against Rhodesia. A special welcome to our honorary Chairperson, Mr.
Relus Ter Beek, MP in the Dutch Parliament who has been a pillar of support
in our campaigns work on Rhodesia in particular, and Southern Africa solidarity
movements in general.
And a special and warm comradely welcome is
extended to the representatives of the Zimbabwe Liberation Movements. They will
be present for both days and we thank them for the honour of hosting them. Comrade
T.J.P Jokonya of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) is the Chairman
of ZANU and main representative in the UK and Europe. Philemon T Makonese
of the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) is a Member of ZAPU’s
Revolutionary Council and Representative in Zambia.
For brevity sake I will not do the roll
call on the attendance register as you are 200 plus who have registered for this
seminal event. Thank you to each and every one of you present. All in your own ways have made significant
contributions in solidarity with the peoples of Southern Africa. Please feel
free to share your experiences during this seminar. There will be ample
opportunity to do this as after each speech sessions will be open for questions,
comments and debate for as long as it takes to hear all who need or wish to
contribute.
I wish to be short and to the point in
these introductory remarks. The contribution from the Dutch Anti Apartheid
Movement will be done by Advocate Annemieke Gerritsma. Her paper is
comprehensive and well thought out and however I may feel tempted to blow the
horn on our achievements in the Netherlands I will resist this urge and leave
matters over to Annemieke and others of the Dutch movement in the audience. Annemieke
is part of our Sanctions Task Team and jointly her colleague, Advocate
Herman v.d Schaar; they not only did sterling research work, but also gave super
guidance to Task Team members who were sometimes involved with unorthodox means
of detection work.
A special word of thanks goes to the
staffs of the Transnational Institute and Dutch Anti Apartheid movement who
have been working tirelessly for months in preparing this seminar.
Finally, we have received a list of
letters of support. In the interests of saving time I will not read them out. They
are available to all who wish to read them. Copies are with the organisers and
free for any one to copy or peruse.
Letters
of support
-
P Prime Minister Den Uyl of the Netherlands
-
President Nyerere of the United Republic of Tanzania
-
Mrs. Hart, Labour MP Ministry of Overseas Development, Great Britain.
-
Mr. Edwin Ogbu, Chairman of the Special Committee on
Apartheid, United Nations.
-
L.H. Horace Perera, Secretary General of the World Federation
of United Nations Associations, Geneva.
-
A.N. Chimuka, Head of the Political Department of the
Organization of African Unity, Addis Ababa.
-
Mr. Tang Ming-Chao, Under Secretary General, Department of
Political Affairs Trusteeship and Decolonisation, New York.
-
The International Labour Organization, Geneva.
-
Mr. E.S. Reddy, Chief Section for African Questions, United
Nations, New York.
-
Mr. Salim Ahmed Salim, Chairman of the Special Committee on
the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the
Granting of Independence to Colonial Peoples and Countries, United Nations, New
York.
-
J.L. Jones, General Secretary of the Transport and General
Workers Union, Great Britain
-
R.W. Right, Executive Councillor of the Amalgamated Union of
Engineering Workers, Great Britain.
-
Mr. L. Murray, General Secretary of the Trades Union
Congress, Great Britain.
-
Mr. R. Meis, General Secretary of the Confederation Generale
du Travail du Luxembourg.
-
Swedish Social Democratic Parry.
-
Communist Party of Great Britain.
-
World Union of Students, Praag.
-
Mr. Knud Kristensen, Vice President of the
Landorganisationen, Danmark
-
Institutt for Fredsforskning / International Peace Research,
Oslo.
-
Mr. B Sjollema, Program to Combat Racism of the World Council
of Churches
-
Committee for the Freedom of Mozambique, Angola and Guine,
London
-
Anti Apartheid Movement Ireland.
I want to say a few words on process to encourage
you for your full participation. The papers presented are rather academic and
most of our speakers are not stand up comedians. So do not feel shy to ask if
you need any clarification at any time. If you wish you can ask for hard copies
of the papers. Please make your contributions at any time you feel appropriate.
Ample time to do that will be available between speakers. I will also keep watch on time to ensure that
there is maximum opportunity for the final plenary session where everything
spoken about during these two days must come together in a comprehensive
programme of action.
Without further ado, I call on our first
speaker, Comrade Philemon Makonese of ZAPU.
Berend Schuitema / Conference
Chairperson
General Secretary
Dutch Anti apartheid Movements
2.
The Significance of the
Sanctions Campaigns for the
Zimbabwe
Liberation Movement
Mr Chairman, honoured guests, ladies and
gentlemen,
We as ZAPU extend out thanks to the Dutch
Anti Apartheid movement in partnership with the Transnational Institute for
their tireless efforts in organizing this Seminar, for inviting us to
participate in its proceedings and to present a paper on the “Significance of the Sanctions Campaign for
the Zimbabwe Liberation Movement”.
We further express our appreciation to the
people and government of this country who have made the holding of this Seminar
possible.
Our paper is a rundown on Sanctions
against Southern Rhodesia as mandated by the Security Council of the United
Nations, as a result of the so-called ‘unilateral declaration of independence’
by Ian Douglas Smith on the 11th of November 1965. The then British
Prime Minister, Harold Wilson gave the assurance to the Rhodesian regime that
no military intervention would be taken by the British government, in the event
of Ian Smith declaring the so-called ‘UDI’.
Soon after the declaration was made,
Britain started running around, appearing to be serious and appealing to the
international community to impose “voluntary” economic sanctions against
Southern Rhodesia. The false prediction Britain gave was that the Rhodesian
regime would fall in “a matter of weeks”. At that time already, we pointed out
that Britain was bent on deceiving and misdirecting the world. Of course,
Britain was doing all that in order to give time to her Rhodesian agents to
consolidate.
The 1965 economic sanctions appeal was not
binding on any one nation since they were voluntary. Only those nations that
remain reliable allies of the national liberation movement of Zimbabwe complied
with the call and imposed sanctions against Southern Rhodesia.
After a year of voluntary sanctions, the
Rhodesian regime showed no sign that it had been seriously affected. Again,
Britain tossed its busy body to impress the world and sought U.N. support to
strengthen sanctions and bring down the so-called ‘rebel regime’. Thus, at her
initiative and request, a United Nations Security Council resolution imposing
selective economic sanctions on Southern Rhodesia was adopted in December 1966.
This had been preceded by a summit meeting between the British Prime Minister
Wilson and Ian Smith on board a British warship the “Tiger” in the Mediterranean
Sea, off the British colony of Gibraltar. Wilson and Smith produced the “Tiger
Proposals”. As a point of emphasis here, a year had passed rather than weeks
and there was no sign that the Rhodesian economy was grinding to a halt.
We are now in the 9th year of
Rhodesia’s so-called ‘UDI’ with UN-backed sanctions on Rhodesia adopted by the
UN Council in May 1963. Are there signs that the economy of Southern Rhodesia
is torn or dwindling as a result of the application of sanctions?
Assessing the strength of the Rhodesian
currency in his budget speech, the regime’s Minister of Finance, John Wrathal,
repudiated calls from Rhodesian industrialists to devalue the Rhodesian $
because of their claims that they had been “hard
hit by two US devaluations and subsequent depreciation of the Rhodesian
currency”. He pointed out, “there is no evidence that Rhodesian exports
are over priced and, if anything – on the basis of relative rated inflation –
there is a case for Rhodesian revaluation rather then devaluation”. He went
on to emphasise, “in fact, of course, the
Rhodesian currency unit has retained an unchanged gold parity now for nearly a
quarter of a century since Rhodesia devalued with the Sterling in 1949”.
This was in his budget statement for the
1973/74 fiscal year when Rhodesia was benefitting from the world commodity
boom. Its important commodities for export remain gold, copper, chrome, nickel,
lithium, cotton, sugar, tobacco and beef, amongst a number of other
commodities.
The question arises: since sanctions
against Rhodesia are UN-based and are now comprehensive, how does it happen
that Rhodesia still succeeds to export its wares, to which countries, by which
manner and means?
As we move to show some of the ways used
to defeat sanctions against Rhodesia, we would like to make certain positions
clear. For good or for bad reasons, the aim of enforcing sanctions is to bring
about elimination of an unwanted development. Sanctions can be a variation, or
a combination of political, legal, diplomatic, economic and military
components. In the case of Rhodesia, sanctions are mainly economic and
politico-diplomatic as instituted by the United Nations.
In addition to this, the political behaviour
of every country is governed by its socio-economic foundations. Capitalist
countries do not abandon business from areas where they have been making
super-profits because that is the inherent character of the capitalist system. Capitalists
will seek all possible ways to retain control of business rather than being
replaced by others.
From the very beginning when Britain
enticed the world by toying with the economic sanctions idea, the Zimbabwe
African Peoples’ Union stated in no uncertain terms that alone, un-backed by
military action, and without including South Africa and Portugal, the proposed
sanctions would not bring the Rhodesian regime to its knees. We still stand by
our word; sanctions can only be of substantial significance if they used as supplementary
and not as the main weapon as has been the case on the Rhodesian issue.
Our political deductions of the British
approach to the application of sanctions against Southern Rhodesia remain
valid; Britain chooses to consolidate the position of her own kith and kin in
order to cling to power and exploit the African people. She made sure that she
led the bandwagon of sanctions on Rhodesia in three stages – voluntary,
selective and comprehensive saw to it that the military aspect was completely excluded
from all quarters.
Why are sanctions raised as most
important? Every move by Britain on sanctions against Rhodesia was preceded by
advance preparations in Rhodesia against those sanctions. As such, the
Rhodesians did not lose time. They opened sanctions-busting officers in Europe,
America, Asia (Japan) and, of course, Africa whose task was to provide new
avenues for carrying out trade with the outside world since the known routes
would be affected by the UN move to isolate Rhodesia.
Offices were opened up in Johannesburg,
Pretoria, Durban Lorenzo Marques, Beira, London, Bonn, Munich, Paris, Rome,
Brussels, Basel (Switzerland), New York, Washington, Sydney, Tokyo, and
possibly in many other centres.
A good number of them, especially in
Europe and America, appear under innocent-looking names. In Paris, the offices
bear the name of “The Rhodesian Information Office” whose address is 110 Rue Le
Boetie 8e. In Basel it is the “Rhodesian Tourist Office” and the address is
P.O. Box 561, Basel, 4001. The Washington Office is known as the “Rhodesian
Information Office” and the New York one appears as the “Rhodesian National
Tourist Board”. In Australia the front office is known as the Rhodesian
Information Centre” under the management of local citizens in Sydney. The
address of the agency in Brussels is No 50, Avenue Winston Churchill. Perhaps
the most notorious one in London is known and appears under the name of the
“Anglo-Rhodesian Society”. Founded by
the late Lord Salisbury, an arch British Imperialist who left vast interests in
Rhodesia and said to be managed by local Britons, the Society engages in
blatant political and economic undertakings in support of the so-called ‘rebel
regime’ while the British government, initiator of the sanctions move, is looking
on.
In this country too, in the Netherlands, there
are two especially notorious agencies working for Rhodesia. The “Netherlands
Rhodesia Society” has gone to the extent of collecting money for the Rhodesian
Army’s Welfare Fund. The other one, the “Rhodesian Promotion Council” engages
in a variety of activities which are now being expanded to both the United
States of America and France.
Switzerland, with its prodigiously
nauseating neutrality, identifies herself with the most obnoxious fascist
regimes of the 20th Century. She stands on side of the oppressive
regimes of Southern Africa thereby strengthening the financial and military machine
that denies and frustrates the African peoples of the region from regaining
their freedom. All other countries mentioned above are members of the United
Nations and are part and parcel of its decisions on sanctions against Rhodesia.
Some of the Rhodesian personalities
involved in the early stages of opening these offices and agencies for creating
clandestine trade avenues are the following: Maltas, a Rhodesian of Greek
origin and respected trouble shooter in Rhodesia. He was involved in the
opening of trade routes from what we earlier referred to as the first stage
when the British called for voluntary sanctions against Rhodesia. His main area
of operation included Italy and Greece. He also touched, but frequently,
London, Basel, and Munich. His travelling document is a South African passport.
Then there is Oxley, another Rhodesian known to be efficient as he is shrewd
who never loses in a business deal. He now manages the Rhodesian Agency in
Brussels. Mervyn Eyett, a Rhodesian businessman based in Salisbury where he is
deputy manager of Air Rhodesia. A frequent traveller to a number of European
capitals, he is said to be Smith’s personal friend and acts as the latter’s
able negotiator on sanctions-busting goals. His name features together with
that of Hirschman (a Swiss millionaire banker with large interests in Africa,
Europe and America) over the case of the three Boeings 720 that are now Air
Rhodesia’s flag carriers on its continually shrinking international routes now
that the one time Portuguese colonies are soon to be independent. There are
many more such persons fielded by the Rhodesian regime for this kind of work.
By the time the United Nations Security
Council passed its resolution on selective sanctions against Southern Rhodesia
in December 1966, Rhodesia had gone a long way in building the new trade
routes. No scratch would be deep enough to cause a serious economic
haemorrhage.
Indeed, for a short time, a disturbing
economic slump was felt in the car assembly industry. By mid 1967 the two car
assembly plants in the country, Ford Motors in Salisbury and British Motor
Corporation in Umtali had virtually come to a stand still. But Rhodesian car
markets did not appear to run out of business. Though selling a bit more
expensive new cars were just as plentiful as before. Besides, the traditional
American and British cars were replaced by French, Japanese, West German and
Japanese cars, namely: Peugeot, Citroen, and Renault, Isuzu, Toyota, Diahatsu,
Romeo, etcetera. These vehicles came by way of Mozambique and South Africa
where at least three pseudo companies importing cars had been established and
operated from Lorenzo Marques, Beira and Johannesburg.
By the end of 1967, the two car assembly
plants mentioned above had started working at full swing and they remain so
today. The majority of their outputs are Japanese, French, West German and
Italian cars. Body kits and spare parts are supplied mainly from South Africa.
Without oil, life is almost impossible in
our time. Since oil was included in the list of commodities for sanctions
against Southern Rhodesia by the UN Security Council resolution of December
1966, one might have justifiably concluded that the regime’s doom was nigh.
This was not possible because the middlemen were themselves sanctions busters.
The main suppliers of oil to Rhodesia
remain Shell and BP, Dutch and British oil concerns respectively. It is as
public a secret that British oil magnates are significant shareholders in Shell
as the Dutch oil magnates are in BP.
With the United Nations Security Council
resolution in operation, oil could not reach Rhodesia through the old and known
Beira-Umtali route. This caused stoppage of work at the Feruka Oil Refinery at
Umtali. But by then, the Rhodesian regime had established an oil agency by the
name of GENTA. The agency had already built a new Oil Refinery in the Midlands
city of Gwelo. Processed oil products are distributed throughout the country by
Shell, BP and Total. GENTA receives its raw oil from the Shell-BP owned Oil
Refinery in Durban. It comes by road and by rail.
Before removal of the fascist regime in
Portugal, the Mozambique ports of Beira and Lorenzo Marques never really
stopped passage of oil to Rhodesia. What was definitely stopped was pumping of
oil into Rhodesia through the Beira-Umtali oil pipeline. Last year alone,
400.000 tons of oil was transported by rail from Lorenzo Marques into Rhodesia.
Behind the manipulation of this business are British, US, Dutch, Portuguese and
Italian oil companies acting through intermediaries. Last year, Lorenzo Marques
handled cargoes that were transported into Rhodesia by rail which reached
2.122.083 tons while Beira handled 718.208 tons.
Now that independence for Mozambique is in
sight – 25th June 1975 – it surprises nobody that in the very short
space of time track-laying has been completed on a new line linking Rhodesia
with the South African Railway system at Beit Bridge. Yet another one from
Gwande to South Africa’s Pietersburg is under consideration.
One would imagine that since the
imposition of sanctions, foreign investments into Rhodesia would be forthcoming
or would be minimal. That would not present the true picture of the economic
scene. The British, US, Canadians and Japanese mining companies have injected a
lot of funds in the Rhodesian mining industry.
The Anglo-American group has also
increased its activity in prospecting for minerals in new areas. The
expenditure of the group in prospecting has been steadily rising. Whereas in
the year that preceded sanctions – 1964 – the group spent far below 100.000
British Pounds, in 1967 the expenditure on prospecting reached 500.000 British
Pounds. And side by side with the opening up of new mines, old mines are being
expanded.
Inyathi Copper and EII Mine are new mines
owned by the Coronation Syndicate of the Lonrho Group. The Messina Group is
also operating new mines, the Gwaai, Shakelton, Norah and Silverside.
Extraction of Nickel remains the province
of Rio Tinto operating the Empress at Gatooma (the mine is undergoing
expansion) and the British Nickel Corporation, a subsidiary of the
Anglo-American which is pitching a big show at Trojan and Madziwa mines. Blanket mine in the Gwanda area at which gold
is extracted is one of Falconbridge’s operations in Rhodesia. Falconbridge is
Canadian. In 1972 Falconbridge entered
into a joint venture with the Rhodesian regime’s parastatal mining development
company, the Mining Promotion Corporation at Umvana and took option on the
Athens mines. A Japanese group is involved at the Mangula copper mines.
There is unprecedented intensification and
expansion of mining activity. As a result, mineral production has reached
record levels at the time when the Rhodesian economy is supposed to be
throttled. In value, the 1972 mineral output reached R$ 105 which represented
64% above its pre-sanctions record. As a matter of fact, the Rhodesian mining
industry suffered a slowdown in the years between 1958 and 1964 but increased
mineral output since the imposition of sanctions. Turner and Newal is a British
company with Head Quarters in Manchester. It has a subsidiary in Rhodesia –
Turner and Newal Rhodesia – involved in the extraction of asbestos, not from
Rhodesia though. It is from a fake company in Johannesburg bearing the name of
Southern Asbestos. South Africa does not produce this type of Asbestos.
There is not a sector in economic activity
that suffered a real pinch uncommon to regimes and countries of the same social
system. In real terms, the Rhodesian regime has managed to retain an average
economic growth rate of 6, 5 % a year since the introduction of sanctions.
Separately, some sectors have even higher growth rates. Agricultural production
has risen by 60% and manufacturing by 67%. What makes this possible is that
while Rhodesia is doing all it can, it also has friends that help and
facilitate in the breaking of sanctions, especially in the field of
international trade.
The
more than 300 million lbs of the Rhodesian Tobacco stockpile has now been
disposed of. A French textile company was involved. Though West Germany stopped
buying tobacco from Rhodesia, the commodity all of a sudden started appearing
on the West German’s trade list with South Africa and represents 33% of its
imports from South Africa.
Mitsui, Mitsubishi and Marabeni are known
big Japanese companies. Since UN-backed sanctions were introduced, they stopped
importing chrome from Rhodesia. As a direct trade with Rhodesia fell, it rose
with South Africa in the same commodity, at the same time and proportion.
Exposure of a variety of networks working
day and night to beat the sanctions warfare against Southern Rhodesia has been
carried out far and wide. The Dutch Anti Apartheid Movement did wonderful work
when it uncovered the Zephyr operations. Head Quartered in Amsterdam, its
operational tentacles stretched as far afield as London, Lisbon, Bonn, Munich,
Mozambique and almost every corner of the world, and finally Rhodesia. Another
network of a similar nature is being run by Kolver, a South African operating
from an office in Johannesburg’s Northcliff suburb. There are many more such
organizations yet undiscovered.
What the British sought by a sanctions
programme was to set the world in pursuit of a mirage. The problem is British
Colonialism. Sanctions are of a supplementary value if properly applied in
support of the armed struggle. The Zimbabwe African Peoples Union took to
the armed struggle in the Zimbabwe revolution as far back as the early 1960s to
solve the colonial problem. Today we
stand by the pledge of the people never to lay down our arms. At the same
time and at every turn of the struggle, we shall not fail to make it clear that
sanctions can render some help but should not be taken as the main weapon.
There is, of course, a current flurry of
rumours and speculations about a possible constitutional solution of the
Rhodesian problem. These speculations are inspired by the British government to
lend credibility to its manoeuvres of diplomatic drafting of the Ian Smith and
Vorster Regimes for direct dealings with independent African states and
possibly with liberation movements.
I must make it quite clear that in our
view this is not the stage of talking about constitutional conferences. We are
fighting for our liberation and we cannot sacrifice lives to achieve
constitutional conferences. Unqualified majority rule and the independence for
Zimbabwe cannot be subjects for negotiation. They must be conceded by both the settler
regime and the British government as a prerequisite to the adjustment of
government for conditions of freedom.
The racist leader, Ian Smith, still
speaks of the racist excuse to oppress us, the so-called “civilized standards”
argument; our National Leader, Joshua Nkomo and hundreds of freedom fighters
are in death cells, prisons and detention cells; South African troops are in
Rhodesia. What talks can be held in an atmosphere of a police-state and
war?
The current manoeuvres and speculations
therefore have neither basis nor a prospect. Ours is to intensify our armed
liberation struggle to liberate ourselves. Towards this, we appeal to all
international supporters to focus their maximum moral, material and financial
support!
Philemon Makonese, Zimbabwe African
Peoples’ Union (ZAPU)
Representative in Zambia and Member
of the ZAPU Revolutionary Council
3.
UN Sanctions and their
Significance to Chimurenga – Revolutionary Armed Struggle
Mr.
Chairman,
Comrades,
I want to thank the organizers of this
seminar, the Dutch Anti Apartheid Movement in partnership with the
Transnational Institute, on behalf of the Zimbabwe African National union
(ZANU) and the ZANU cadres of the liberation army ZANLA, for asking us to come
and share this platform with you. In the history of each struggle by people for
self-determination there are important phases where every aspect of their
struggle has to undergo thorough going revolutionary criticism and
re-examination. In the Zimbabwe struggle we are going to a stage where we are
feeling the full brunt of the siege by the capitalist and the imperialist world
through their lackeys the fascists and racists in Salisbury. It is only proper
that during this crucial period of our struggle we scrutinize every aspect of
our problems.
You have asked us to outline what we
consider to be the implications of economic sanctions on the settlers’ ability
to hold on to the last vestiges of a colonial heritage against the
intensification of Chimurenga by the ZANLA (Zimbabwe African National Union
Liberation Army) forces. We welcome this opportunity and hope that at the end
of this seminar we shall have made significant contributions to the raising of
your consciousness to our revolutionary armed struggle being waged in Zimbabwe.
The Zimbabwe African National Union
conceives our struggle as a global or international struggle against capitalism
and imperialism and its concomitants, racism and fascism. The history of
economic sanctions in our country really goes back to the 1890s, when a band of
imperialist exploiters backed by such monopolistic companies as the British
South Africa Company, established themselves north of the Limpopo River by
trickery and force of arms. Since that time successive British governments have
endeavoured to concoct sell-out solutions which would have legitimized the
usurpation of Zimbabwe by their kith and kin. From 1923 right up to 1972 the
British government has conspired with the settler minority regime to work out
some opportunistic solutions with the help of the African bourgeois
nationalist. The latest attempt was the so-called1972-Pearce proposals which
were worked out between the fascist leader Ian Smith and none other than Alex
Douglas-Home who in 1938 learnt the art of trading with fascists when he signed
the so-called “peace with honour” deal with Adolf Hitler at Munich.
Unfortunately for the British imperialists and their backers the people of
Zimbabwe had long since known that there were no real interests in the
imperialist world safe for their future except when these were associated with
the white settlers and the exploitation of the African’s labour, land and
resources.
The Declaration of Independence (UDI) by
the imperialist lackeys therefore came as no surprise to us. It was a logical
conclusion of attempts by successive British governments to secure a permanent
foothold of economic exploitation through the intermediation of their fascist
lackeys. The so-called “rebellion” against the Crown was a carefully conceived
imperialist plot which was meant to provide the settlers with a chance of
getting international recognition through the back door.
The theatrical performance by Harold
Wilson’s administration in seeking the imposition of economic sanctions and his
denunciation of the illegal regime was hypocritical and spurious. It is a well
known fact that from the very beginning the so-called economic sanctions were
no more than a gesture in lieu of the action necessary to put down the
rebellion. This explains why it took more than two years for Britain to
introduce “comprehensive mandatory sanctions” by which time the settler regime
had worked out a network of sanctions busting mechanisms with the help of the
capitalist world. This charade on the part of the British government and their
kith and kin was clearly demonstrated when they got together soon after the
antics at the UN to try and iron out a settlement at the now infamous “Tiger
Talks”
The background to the imposition of
sanctions brings us to an important issue of debate. The question before us is
armed struggle. We have suggested so far that sanctions were part of an
imperialist plot aimed at giving the lackeys in Salisbury time to consolidate
their position. It is important at this juncture to make a brief survey of how
the international community responded to this plot. It is not our intention to
catalogue here every aspect of the capitalist western world’s response to UDI,
and UN sanctions. We shall outline a few classical examples of these areas
where the imperialist capitalist world came to the aid of their lackeys thus
making null and void UN sanctions against the Smith regime.
The response of the international
community, particularly the western world was revealing. While Britain paraded
as her acquired weapon the Smith regime, British mass media and institutions
were busy aiding the regime in its sanctions busting operations. British travel
agents continue to advertise and recruit personnel for the “illegal regime”.
Particularly active in this field were the Times and the Daily Telegraph. To
such bodies as Econ Air International, London ECI, the regime receives
effective support in its drive for manpower. Outside Britain the regime’s
morale was boosted by acquiring of DC 8 jet airplanes from Europe as well as
the services of trained European pilots amidst a charade of publicity. In 1971
the regime acquired 7 planes for its air force: the Aemachi built by an Italian
company. Recently the American, British, French and Jordanian imperialists
combined in a deal that provided 41 Centurion tanks to Smith. All governments
denied any knowledge of this but the deal went through without a hitch.
The early in 1972 Byrd Amendment which
legalized the import of Rhodesian chrome and nickel to the arch imperialist
state of the USA opened the floodgate for more violations. “Zephyr”, in
conjunction with 16 other countries joined in February of 1974 to set up an
international trading network for goods required by the Smith regime. Austria
and West Germany were recently exposed by Kenneth McIntosh as great sanctions
busters.
Dr. Rolf Egli, a Zurich lawyer was
recently tried for raising 12 million British Pounds as a foreign loan for the
expansion of Rhodesia’s iron and steel industry. A Swiss firm sold three Boeing
planes to Rhodesia in February 1974. The battle to save the minority regime by
the Western powers has gathered such a momentum that Ian Smith has recently
boasted that trade with some countries, the USA in particular, is three times
the size of what it was in 1965. Comrades, all these details clearly show that
sanctions against Rhodesia are an imperialist hoax.
The
effects of Sanctions
Given the concerted effort by NATO and the
western allies to sustain the settlers by hook or by crook, have sanctions been
at all effective? The effect of sanctions on the Rhodesian economy has been
insignificant but nevertheless politically important. Among other things
sanctions have dealt a psychological blow to the Smith regime by denying him
outright victory. They have ensured diplomatic isolation without which Rhodesia
can never get fully-fledged support from her western allies. They have imposed
a financial strain on the regime through the ever rising cost of sanctions
busting operations particularly now that Mozambique is no longer a member of
the axis powers. They have, moreover, maintained international focus on
Rhodesia and exposed the hypocritical nature of British assertions of her
custodianship of the oppressed peoples of Zimbabwe thus throwing the ball in
the court of the people of Zimbabwe themselves.
Positive
Effects
Having given the negative aspects, it is
only fair to state that there have been positive factors in the UN sanctions.
The Rhodesian tobacco plantations have suffered greatly through lack of
markets. The scarcity of rolling-stock and the shortage of foreign currency
have all resulted directly from the imposition of sanctions. Of late the
closing of the border with Zambia has proved to be a self-inflicted wound to
the regime. When these incidental effects of sanctions on Rhodesia are taken
into consideration, it can be said with some justification that sanctions are
an adjunct to armed struggle. They may not be effective but where they are
applied they contribute towards aiding Chimurenga.
Economic
sanctions and the armed revolutionary struggle
The outline we have given of the effects
of sanctions against the racist regime in Rhodesia is generally regarded by
ZANU as an affair between the fascist lackeys of imperialism in our country and
their backers in the western world. It is only significant to the struggle in
so far as it places it in the international setting. ZANU accepts the premise
that our struggle in Southern Africa as a whole is fundamentally between
exploiters and the exploited. The exploiters who control political, economic
and military power happen to be wholly white which brings in a racial dimension
to our struggle. But we are aware that racism, like fascism, is the result of
the irrationality of capitalism. That is why the capitalist world does not, and
cannot see the validity of our struggle for self determination. Thus economic
sanctions in themselves are irrelevant to our cause.
We suggested earlier that the subject of
economic sanctions and UDI dates back to the days of the partition of Africa.
The Zimbabwe African National Union was aware of the historical developments
which led to our receptiveness to colonization and was determined to put an end
to the attitude of the masses that they were helpless and indifferent to the
decades of humiliation and exploitation that has been going on in Zimbabwe. To
this effect they launched the era of confrontation in Zimbabwe which has now
developed into today’s armed struggle. During the nine years that we have been
struggling against the fascists and their backers we have more or less put
aside the idea of international aid through sanctions as a contribution to our
struggle. We fully accepted the dictum of the ZANU President when he declared
ten years ago:
“Independence is not ours unless we liberate ourselves. There is no such
thing as being liberated by others. Others can only help us to liberate
ourselves but ultimately we are our own liberators”
This
stand by ZANU, Mr. Chairman, suggests that economic sanctions are only relevant
to our struggle if they are part of the world’s progressive forces contribution
to our struggle. Now that Mozambique has finally taken her place among the
nations of the world, it is possible for progressive movements to campaign and
expose your governments in their daily sanctions-busting activities. Once more,
a lifeline has been removed from the citadel of fascism and racism which linked
her with her western backers. The struggle for the liberation of Zimbabwe is
only a part of a major struggle to free Azania and Namibia. Your support is
going to be very crucial in the next difficult months ahead. Do not forget that
sanctions in themselves are not important. We need immediate material support.
ZANU and ZAPU have hundreds and thousands of people who have been thrown into
concentration camps. We have to feed them educate them and protect them. We
need money NOW. We need hard cash, Mr. Chairman. We need clothing and medical
supplies. We need books, and every form of material help possible. If you
couple all these things with your sanctions intensification campaign, we shall
together soon be on the road to victory.
Our contention that revolutionary armed
struggle is the only method of achieving justice and humanity in Zimbabwe, is
contested hotly by capitalists be they liberals or conservatives. But we know
as well as you do that their contention is based on the full realization that
through armed revolutionary struggle their lackeys stand no chance in Zimbabwe.
It is appropriate perhaps to show how Chimurenga has been able to do in a short
space of time what sanctions have not and cannot do.
When Ian Smith declared UDI, ZANU answered
the challenge by dealing telling blows at the enemy at Sinoia in April 1966. It
was this battle, and many others that followed that brought Wilson and Smith
together in the first attempt at a salvage operation during the “Tiger Talks”.
In 1972 ZANU launched its current offensive in the north, north-eastern and
eastern parts of Zimbabwe. In this offensive ZANU, using its forces, ZANLA, is
dealing daily telling blows on the occupation forces. This has led to:
1.
Smith negotiating with right-wing opportunistic African petty
bourgeois nationalists;
2.
Forced hundreds of white settlers to flee Zimbabwe;
3.
Forced Smith to mobilize all settlers into the army;
4.
Forced Smith to double his defence budget;
5.
Forced Smith to admit for the first time that there is
uncertainty in the country and, so, call a snap election.
This state of affairs was brought about by
only 18 months of intensive war by ZANU, while ten years of sanctions have
provided nothing but comfort for Smith. Be this as it may, we still feel that
sanctions have a role to play in our struggle. They help to keep the Zimbabwe
issue alive internationally. They keep the enemy occupied in his search for
ways and means to evade sanctions. These are small but significant
contributions. The contributions could be more if only the capitalist world
would realise that their interests in Southern Africa can no longer be served
by a corrupt fascist regime.
Finally, we feel that armed struggle as a
method provides for us conditions under which to rebuild Zimbabwe. Our problems
are the product of years of capitalist oppression. The solution to these is the
overthrow of capitalist rule, after the destruction of the bourgeois state.
This can only be achieved through armed struggle and not by such capitalist
devices as economic sanctions which seek only superfluous change. We put it to
you, comrades, that given this premise, the commitment of the progressive
forces of the world should be to Chimurenga and not to sanctions!
TJP Jokonya
Chairman of the Zimbabwe African
National Union (ZANU)
Representative
in the UK and Western Europe
Amsterdam 29th
November 1974
4.
Recent developments in
Mozambique and South Africa and implications for the struggle of the Zimbabwe
people
Summary
Mr. Terry gave a short survey of his paper outlining his
main conclusions:
Conclusion 1: The sanctions campaign
must be intensified and extended to the sanctions –breakers, i.e. South
Africa.
It is clear that the Zimbabwe
Liberation Movements see the sanctions campaign as ancillary to armed struggle to
overthrow the Smith regime. For the Solidarity Movements sanctions are a
political means to win support for the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe.
In the West, the sanctions campaign is
directed against the Western companies and governments. Mozambique stands out
of this. It cannot be required of Mozambique to harm itself by cutting off
completely her relations with South Africa and Rhodesia. Mozambique is clamped
in an historic pattern of relations forced upon it by the imperialist
countries.
Conclusion II: Material support for
the liberation movements is very much needed.
The discussion aggravates mainly on the
support for FRELIMO. Just now Mozambique stands at the beginning of the
struggle for real independence or a neo-colonial ‘solution’. As a means of
support development aid is being propagated, although many are suspicious of
this instrument. It is becoming clear that Frelimo itself has to decide what it
wants and the progressive groups in the Western countries cannot manage the
liberation movements, nor can they take initiatives on their own. Only when the
liberation movements themselves are asking for development aid can action be
taken to organize any support. Much more the tasks of action groups are to
clarify the fraudulent nature of this aid to the people in the Western
countries.
Conclusion 111: To prevent a
“sell-out” of Rhodesia by means of a constitutional conference.
Especially in Britain this point draws
attention. Action groups there cannot do much against the powerful lobby of the
industry for a constitutional conference as soon as possible. Support from
abroad is necessary. An agreement based on the six points of Douglas Hume is
unacceptable for the liberation movements. The only solution is the transfer of
power to the liberation movements.
Introduction
Nine years has now passed since the white
minority regime in Rhodesia illegally declared its “independence” from Great
Britain. Recent political developments both within Rhodesia and in Southern
Africa as a whole have revealed as never before the essential vulnerability of
the regime and the interests it represents.
In particular, the balance of forces
within Southern Africa has altered radically as a result of the overthrow of
fascism in Portugal. The liberation movement in Mozambique, FRELIMO, now has
within its grasp the fruits of victory over Portuguese colonialism. In Angola,
although the situation is more complex, there is a clear prospect of
independence, despite the efforts of the West to promote division amongst the
liberation forces. These developments, together with the achievement of
independent statehood by Guinea-Bissau, are in themselves of tremendous importance.
What further significances do they have for the position of the Smith regime,
and the struggle of the people of Zimbabwe?
The
internal situation
In order to make an accurate assessment,
an analysis of events within Rhodesia itself is necessary. The most significant
development is the growing success of the liberation struggle. The recent
advances, particularly since the latter half of 1972, following as they do on
the overwhelming rejection by the African people of the 1971 settlement
proposal, are an indication of the desire of the African people to achieve
majority rule. The decision to wage armed struggle, which began in 1966, was
taken in the recognition that the legal struggle was no longer possible. The
Zimbabwe African Peoples’ Union (ZAPU) and the Zimbabwe African National Union
(ZANU) had been banned in 1962 and 1964 respectively, and previously both the
African National Congress in 1959 and the National Democratic Party in 1961 had
also been banned. Additionally, many nationalist leaders, including Joshua
Nkomo, President of ZAPU and Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole, President of ZANU,
had been and still are being detained.
Details of the development of the
liberation struggle have been reported in United Nations publications
(Objective Justice Vol. 6, Nr. 2) and also a recent study produced by the
International Institute of Strategic Studies (London). In March 1973 under the
auspices of the Organization of African Unity an agreement was signed between
ZAPU and ZANU providing for the creation of a joint political council and
military command. The signing of this agreement coincided with a period of
escalation of the armed struggle, which has continued unabated.
The extent of guerrilla activities can be
crudely measured from the figures issued by the Smith regime itself. They admit
to the loss of 49 members of their security forces and 134 civilians, and they
also claim to have killed 430 guerrillas. In addition, it appears that some 13
members of the South African security forces have been killed.
The response of the white minority to the
successes of the liberation struggle has been to intensify the oppression of
the African majority. Since January 1973 this intensification has involved the
introduction of collective fines (January 1973); the closure of schools,
businesses, etcetera (February 1973); the creation of prohibited areas on the
border with Mozambique (May 1973); the forced removal of over 8.000 Africans to
“protected villages” (Autumn 1973); the introduction of the death penalty for
those found guilty of “failing” to report terrorists (September 1973); the
introduction of new passes (with photographs) for Africans living in eight
districts in North East Rhodesia (November 1973); the provision of summary
powers to the District Commissioners enabling them to fine and whip (February
1974); the introduction of forced labour for Africans aged 12 – 60 (February
1974); the destruction of kraals and detention of rural Africans (February
1974); and the removal of rural Africans from the North East border areas to
Beit Bridge on the border with South Africa (April 1974). Other measures were
introduced including the destruction of crops, widespread detentions and
brutality.
In July 1974, in response to growing
popular support for the liberation struggle, the regime launched Operation
Overlord I. This entailed the forced removal of almost 50.000 Africans in the
Chiwese Tribal Trust Land, just 70 miles from Salisbury, into 21 “protected
villages”. These villages, which have been likened to the strategic hamlets of
Vietnam and the aldeamentos of Mozambique, are virtually rural concentration
camps. In September, a further 16.500 inhabitants of the Madziwa Tribal Trust
Land were moved into “protected villages”, in Operation Overlord II.
The Smith regime has admitted publicly to
having executed 24 liberation fighters since January 1973, and has imprisoned
over 95 for offences under the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act.
Attempts by the Rhodesian security forces
to maintain “Law and Order” have led to a critical situation within their own
ranks. Expenditure has been increased dramatically. The defence estimate for
the current year is 17 percent greater than last year’s budget, and this figure
has more than trebled since 1965. In addition, the vote for internal affairs
has been increased by 46% over the last year, and the roads estimate by 55%.
These latter figures are a direct reflection of security demands for better
roads in the operational area, new protective fences, warning systems, and the
resettlement programme referred to earlier.
There have been manpower shortages in both
the military and police sectors which have forced the regime to provide
substantial increases in pay. This situation has arisen despite compulsory
military services for all whites between the ages of 18 – 22, the removal of
exemption for students, and general liability to recall for reserve duties up
to the age of 38.
The Rhodesian Air Force has experienced
some losses: two aircraft were apparently shot down within a fortnight. There
have been growing signs of unrest amongst the Africans in the forces. In the autumn
1973 five soldiers were court-martialled and it has been reported that a number
have deserted the army to join the liberation struggle.
Meanwhile, the Sunday Tribune (Durban)
reported on October 13, 1974, that “some senior military men and special branch
officers are increasingly dissatisfied with the role they have to play”, and
quoted one of them saying:
“They
know we aren’t winning any hearts and minds in our campaign, because the
Government simply won’t shift an inch on the political front. So they’re just
being asked to play the bully boy”.
The Rhodesian security forces rely for
assistance on their counterparts in South Africa. A large contingent of several
thousand South African paramilitary police operated in Rhodesia since 1967.
Estimates vary but it is widely assured that the number has increased
significantly during the past two years. But the crisis of the white settler
community is not restricted to the security situation. Trends in white immigration are both an
indicator of the morale of the settler population, and a factor which will
affect the future strength of the Rhodesian security forces. Latest figures
show a net emigration of 290 whites in April 1974, compared with a net
immigration of 100 in April 1973, and 1.020 in April 1972. This decline has
taken place despite the regime’s massive Settler ’74 campaign, which was
designed to recruit a million settlers.
In addition tourism is suffering, both
because of guerrilla activity and as a result of oil sanctions. The
reintroduction of oil rationing in February 1974 following the decision of the
Arab states to ban the supply of oil to South Africa, Portugal and Rhodesia, is
creating economic problems for many sectors of industry and commerce. Despite
the continual claims by regime spokesmen that the economy is strong and healthy
it is very different. Lack of foreign exchange has meant that capital equipment
improvements have not occurred and there are many shortages. Invisible earnings
have been badly hit by the drop in income from rail transport following the
border closure with Zambia. During 1973 the Rhodesian economy was only kept in
the black through a massive inflow of foreign investment. It is against this
background of an increasingly critical internal situation that the impact of
events in the former Portuguese colonies must be viewed. This section will
concentrate on the significance of events in Mozambique, both because the
situation there is clearer, and because of its closer relationship to future
developments in Rhodesia. Because of South Africa’s dominant role in the region
(and its grip upon Rhodesia) its links with Mozambique will be dealt with at
the same time.
On the surface, both Smith and Vorster
have been at pains to declare an attitude of equanimity towards events in
Mozambique. The reality has been more sinister. In July, the Officer Commanding
the Rhodesian Army opened a new barracks at Inyanga, on the Mozambique border,
costing 340.000 British Pounds. They were an indication, he said, of how
Rhodesia “plans long before it is
necessary”, for the deployment and operations of the army and other
security forces in defence of the country.
“In
this respect, I would like to mention now that further plans are being made,
and in some cases executed, to provide for other deployments on the eastern
edge of the country, as and when these become necessary”.
South Africa adopted a similar stance. At
the very time that the Mozambique provisional government, with a majority of
FRELIMO appointees, was taking office, the South African army was being mobilized
along the border of Mozambique. Throughout the period since the overthrow of
fascism in Portugal the torturers of the Portuguese secret police formerly
based in Angola and Mozambique have been given refuge within “South Africa and
Rhodesia”. The mass panic exodus of white settlers from the previous Portuguese
territories has been encouraged by both white regimes, in South Africa’s case
by a waiving of the normal immigration regulations. The attitudes of the South
African government has also been displayed by the banning of pro-FRELIMO
rallies, and the arrest of 14 of their organizers under the Terrorism Act,
while the green light has been given for large rallies by racist Portuguese
refugees in Salisbury, Pretoria, Johannesburg and Cape Town.
The
economic relationship between Mozambique, on the one hand, and South Africa and
Rhodesia on the other is clearly of the utmost importance for the future of
Southern Africa, worth looking at in a little detail. There are three major
factors involved:
1.
A large part of
the migrant labour force on the gold and coal mines of the Transvaal comes from
Mozambique. This means that at any one
time some100.000 Africans are working in South Africa. Payments received by the
Mozambique administration in lieu of a tax on the labour of Mozambique workers
has hitherto been in gold at the official price, which can then be sold at the
free market price for considerably more. For a country with a substantial trade deficit
(3.000 million escudos in 1972), this is an important consideration. On the
other hand, the extent of South Africa’s dependence must be recognized. It
obtains one-third of the labour force for the Transvaal mines in this way, at a
time when Africans from South Africa, Malawi and Lesotho are increasingly
reluctant to work in sub-human conditions for the pittance which they receive. (3
British Pounds per week in 1972). The gold which is produced by the Transvaal
mines is absolutely vital to the South African economy.
2.
South Africa and
Rhodesia between them account for 95% percent of the traffic through the
southern Mozambique port of Lorenzo Marques. Together with Beira, whose
importance has diminished because of FRELIMO actions, this is a valuable source
of foreign exchange bringing in 2.000 million escudos in 1972. Once again,
however, the South African and Rhodesians are also in a situation of
dependence. South Africa’s ports are suffering a chronic overloading, and they
need Lorenzo Marques to take their own traffic and a substantial portion of
that needed by Rhodesia, in order to avoid intolerable congestion.
3.
The Cobora Bassa
dam, which has been built, with the aid of South African finance in the Tete
province of Mozambique, will require customers for its hydro-electric power.
South Africa’s industrial development makes it the only obvious candidate at
present, and this monopoly position gives it the opportunity to lever the price
down. At the same time, it depends on the power from the dam to some considerable
degree, as demand for electric power within South Africa increases at about ten
percent per annum. Based upon this brief survey of the economic relationship
between Mozambique and the white south, it is possible to draw certain
conclusions:
A.
Their degree of
interdependence will make it impossible for Mozambique to cut links overnight.
B.
But as long as the
links remain, there is the constant danger that South Africa and, to a much
lesser extent, Rhodesia will use their positions of strength to disrupt the
newly independent state.
C.
It would be a
mistake, however, to assume that the power lies completely with the white
regimes. In the last analysis, the links are at least as economically important
to Rhodesia and South Africa as they are to Mozambique. This is particularly
true in the case of Rhodesia, due to the arbitrary closure of the border with
Zambia, and its consequent isolation when Zambia refused to reopen the border.
Rhodesia’s isolation may be further increased if pressure grows within Malawi
for a reassessment of its relationship with the racist regimes, in the light of
the changed position in the sub-continent.
D.
The ability of
Mozambique to break with Rhodesia will depend in large measure on the help
which is forthcoming from the international community. Britain has a particular
responsibility in this regard, both because of the support which it gave to
Portuguese colonialism, and because of the need to increase the effectiveness
of sanctions.
In
addition to the economic factors involved, there is the immensely significant
fact, in military and political terms that Rhodesia now has black-rule states -
either hostile or potentially hostile - on 92 % of its borders. Moreover
successes of the liberation movements particularly in Mozambique have
heightened the aspirations of the people of Zimbabwe and have provided them
with a new sense of militancy.
Increased
Reliance on South Africa
The white minorities of South Africa and
Rhodesia have been closely linked ever since the latter country was colonized
by the Anglo-South African capitalist and politician , Cecil John Rhodes, under
the auspices of his company, the British South Africa Company. The dependence
of Rhodesia upon South Africa was increased in the period after UDI, and will
clearly extend even further with the changed situation in Mozambique.
In addition to their fundamental
similarities, the regimes are linked to each other by a network of coordination
in the economic, military and political spheres. The most spectacular field of
cooperation as far as the mass media in this country are concerned, has been
trade. By persuading a policy euphemistically labelled “business as usual”,
South Africa has become Rhodesia’s main intermediary with the outside world.
The UN Secretariat concluded: “During
1969 – 1971 exporters in South Africa and Mozambique handled merchandise of
Southern Rhodesia at a level of over 200 million tons annually”. Less
obvious has been growing South African penetration of investment within
Rhodesia. The top three and five of the top ten companies operating in Rhodesia
are wholly or partly South African owned. It is certain that South African
traders and investors have not been operating north of the border out of
altruism. Their services have been amply rewarded with the super-profits of the
middleman in the black market situation.
South Africa’s help to the illegal regime
has not been limited to the economic sphere. South African paramilitary police
operate in the border areas assisting Rhodesian security forces. South African
ministers make regular visits to Rhodesia. In July 1973 Mr. Vorster himself
visited the border areas. South African visitors play a major role in assisting
the tourist industry. Rhodesia, although not having diplomatic relations with
South Africa, does have a diplomatic representation in Pretoria.
In March this year press reports indicated
that South Africa was contributing direct financial aid to Rhodesia for
security measures designed to combat the liberation struggle. The relationship
appears to have become even closer since April.
An indication of the dependence Rhodesia
now has on South Africa was the visit at the end of the May by Mr. Smith to
South Africa to meet Mr. Vorster in the wake of events in Portugal. This should
be contrasted with Mr. Smith’s unilateral action in 1973 when he closed the
border with Zambia which met with the obvious disapproval of South Africa.
South Africa appears to be quite determined, however, to assist in the
maintenance of white supremacy in Rhodesia. In this context the rapid
completion of the construction of the direct rail link with South Africa shows
that they wish to be able to maintain this support whatever developments take
place in Mozambique.
The
danger of sell-out
An article in the Financial Times (12th
August 1974) pinpoints the danger of a deal between Britain and the Smith
regime, as once again imminent. The article is worth quoting at some length
because of the insight that it gives into the thinking of the British
Government:
“MR. JAMES CALLAGHAN, the Foreign
Minister, now believes that a new British initiative on Rhodesia could best
coincide with the granting of independence to Mozambique. This is one of the
results of the new review of British policy in southern Africa which has been
underway almost since the Labour Government took office in March and which,
officially, is still continuing. No official announcement of its completion is
expected. Mr. Callaghan has concluded that an independent Mozambique could
create new problems for the Rhodesian economy, especially if supplies were cut
off from the Mozambique port of Beira. Politically, the independence of the
Portuguese territory would also increase Rhodesia’s isolation. The time would
then be ripe for a new attempt at a Rhodesian settlement, though the precise
form it would take would depend on circumstances at the time.”
A settlement, then, is the British
government’s aim. As far as the method is concerned, they are now apparently
involved in intensive diplomatic activity in an attempt to get some sort of
round-table conference off the ground. The chances of any such conference being
acceptable to the majority of the African people are remote in view of the
regime’s refusal even to contemplate talks with ZANU and ZAPU. (This
effectively excludes the African National Council, whose present stance is that
a conference would be unacceptable without the presence of detained liberation
movement leaders).
Conclusion
Recent events within Mozambique, and
Rhodesia itself, open the new prospects for the liberation of Zimbabwe. They
also place an increased burden of responsibility upon the international
solidarity movement. The ability of the independent state of Mozambique to
implement sanctions against the Smith regime will depend in large measure upon
the extent of help given to her economy by the international community. Her
ability to extend more direct aid to the people of Zimbabwe will depend on the
extent to which she has the full-hearted backing of the outside world. It
appears probable that the South African help will continue to intensify, and
this means that international pressure must be built up for “sanctions against
the sanctions breakers”. Help for the liberation movements fighting the regime
must also increase. Finally, in the near future there is likely to be another
concerted attempt by Britain to reach a settlement with the regime. For all
these reasons, a stepping up of work done in solidarity with the people of
Zimbabwe is more urgent than ever before.
References
1.
Insurgency in Rhodesia, 1957 – 1973: An Account and
Assessment,
by A.R. Wilkinson. The International Institute of Strategic Studies, London
2.
Objective: Justice: Vol. 6, Nr. 2, UN Unit on Apartheid,
New York
3.
Rhodesia: South Africa’s Sixth Province, by John Sprack,
International Defence and Aid Fund, London
4.
The Struggle for a Birthright, by E Klambo, C. Hurst & Co.,
London
5.
Southern Africa Information Service, Vol. 3, 1973 International
Defence and Aid Fund
6.
UDI, by Robert C. Good, Faber and Faber, London
J.M. Sprack & M.D. Terry
British Anti Apartheid Movement
November 1974
5.
The United Nations and
International Sanctions Policy on Rhodesia
In order to understand the
international policy of economic sanctions against Rhodesia and to consider the
manner in which it has been operated by the world community it is important to
understand the background to the dispute which led to adopting the sanctions
policy. By looking at the response of the British government to the UDI of
November 1965 it is possible to relate the true purpose of sanctions policy
whereas the resolutions of the Security Council only serve to provide a partial
picture.
Before the Smith regime seized independence
illegally in 1965 the British Government issued clear warnings of the type of
action which would follow any rebellion by the colony against the
administration authority: notification was given publicly in advance that force
would not be used but a programme of sanctions applied instead. As a result of
this warning Ian Smith held urgent consultations with the Pretoria regime and
made extensive trade and financial arrangements with South Africa to counteract
sanctions. Measures were taken within Rhodesia included mining of the Kariba
Dam with explosives and printing rationing coupons in advance of UDI. Thus,
Rhodesia and South Africa were fully aware prepared to defeat the sanctions
which followed the formal seizure of independence.
The Labour Government in 1965 had a small
Parliamentary majority and this was often given as the reason for trying to
adopt policies with regard to Rhodesia which would be supported by the
Conservative Party. Prime Minister Wilson repeatedly stressed the importance of
establishing an inter-party consensus towards Rhodesia. The major point made at
the time by British Ministers was that there was no need for Conservatives to
oppose the sanctions policy since British policy was to impose only ‘non
punitive’ sanctions against the Smith regime. The argument was that firm and
sharp sanctions would only turn the Smith regime away from any reasonable
behaviour. The first stage of sanctions policy against Rhodesia was based on
not punishing the rebels but merely conveying British displeasure at the
rebellion against the Crown. Even those token sanctions were sabotaged in
advance by Britain declaring that it would not expect South Africa to comply
with them!
United
Nations Resolutions
At the United Nations Britain first took
up the matter by asking all states not to recognize the illegal regime and
refrain from rendering any assistance to it. (Resolution S/216, of 12th
November 1965.) This was followed by a second appeal to desist from supplying
arms and other supplies to Rhodesia and preventing it from receiving oil
supplies. (Resolution S/217 of 20th November 1965.) Two major
attempts at reaching a settlement between the Smith regime and Britain failed
and were followed by resolutions S/232 of 16th December 1966 which
imposed selective mandatory sanctions. Resolution S/253 of 29th May
1968 introduced comprehensive mandatory sanctions with certain specific goods
exempted on humanitarian grounds.
During the various debates in the Security
Council on these Resolutions the Afro-Asian countries regularly pointed to the
futility of a mandatory programme of UN sanctions which were specifically
intended to exclude South Africa and Portugal, Britain maintained in the words
of the then Foreign Secretary, George Brown, that “sanctions must not be allowed to escalate into economic confrontation
with third countries”. (UN Security Council debate, December 1966).
The consistent theme in British policy
over Rhodesia is that she wants “no economic confrontation with South Africa”
When this policy was first attacked the explanation provided was that nothing
must be done to damage relations with South Africa because its help will be
needed to settle the Rhodesian problem. At other times Britain pointed out that
it has substantial investments in the Republic which is also an important
trading partner so there must be no question of enforcing sanctions against
South Africa. This meant of course that South Africa could break sanctions
against Rhodesia at will, and at the same time provide all forms of direct
support for the illegal regime.
It is clearly in the interests of South
Africa not only to preserve the Smith regime but also to discredit the
instrument of economic sanctions as a method of international action. The
sanctions policy initiated by Britain can be seen in its true perspective when
we consider why the alternative of force was not used in this case. In
virtually every other colonial rebellion the British Government has used force
almost as a matter of routine. But in the case of Rhodesia the minority regime
racist regime was assured in advance of UDI that force would not be used. One
argument against the use of force was that Britain would have been involved in
fighting against “kith and kin”. This was a prospect which the Conservative
Party and racist sections of the British public with racist loyalties would not
accept. There was also a larger question that if force was in fact used then
the outcome would be unpredictable because not only would the oppressed African
people of Zimbabwe also join in the fighting against the Smith regime but could
lead to a serious disturbance of the racial power situation in Rhodesia and
could very easily ignite the whole region of Southern Africa. Britain certainly
did not want to do anything to create a wider conflict involving the entire
white power system in the region. Here lies the major reason for the “no confrontation with South Africa”
policy. The over riding consideration over policy towards Rhodesia is that
nothing should be done which would harm South Africa or help create instability
in the region.
But the rebellion was in open defiance of
the authority of the colonial power and an insult to the Crown. Britain had to
do something at least to allay domestic and international protests but had to
make sure that it did not do too much to upset the situation in Rhodesia or
Southern Africa. Thus the policy of sanctions was adopted as an ad hoc decision
aimed at taking the heat out of a tense situation as an alternative to using
force. Opinion in Britain was assured that the sanctions policy
against Rhodesia would not be punitive whereas the Commonwealth Prime Ministers
in Lagos were told that it would have the effect of ousting the Smith regime
within three weeks.
Over the years the African people of
Zimbabwe have realized that they cannot expect the British government or the
world community to act decisively against Rhodesia and that it is they who have
to bring about their own liberation. As a result the liberation struggle has
been stepped up and countered with increasing repression on the part of the
racist regime and a higher level of military involvement by South Africa.
Rhodesia is today a virtual colony of South
Africa and dependent on South Africa armed support for its survival. The
operation of the international programme of economic sanctions against Rhodesia
has been effectively sabotaged by South Africa and Portugal and most Western
countries show little interest or concern for compliance – by their nationals
or by their companies – when cases of violation of sanctions are made known
they are slow to prosecute and penalties are low. Often inadequate national
legislation is indicated as the reason for no action being taken against those
who continue to have dealings with Rhodesia. The remedy of course lies in the
hands of these Governments which can introduce comprehensive legislation to
cover all loopholes. But the political will to do so is been lacking.
Sanctions
and Liberation
The problem has to be faced as to what
should be done about sanctions by those who support the liberation struggle in
Zimbabwe. Even though sanctions are not operated efficiently they do deny to
the Smith regime a series of benefits and increases the cost of maintaining
international dealings. It is an effective international legal tool which can
do considerable harm to the racist regime. For this reason it ought to be
maintained and utilized in every way possible. However, it is absolutely
crucial that these sanctions are not seen as the means of bringing the downfall
of the Smith regime or white domination in Rhodesia. Sanctions, as operated
internationally were never intended for that purpose by Britain and other
Western powers. In working for the tighter application of sanctions sight must
not be lost on the need to provide support for the liberation struggle in
Zimbabwe so that the campaign to intensify sanctions does not become – as it
has often in the past – an alternative to the African liberation struggle. In
the campaign for increasing the effectiveness of sanctions against Rhodesia it
is crucial that special attention is paid to two areas: the role of the Western
Countries including members of the EEC, Switzerland, the United States of
America and Japan which continue to be lax in implementing sanctions; the role
of South Africa as their major sanctions buster and to a lesser extent that of
Portugal.
With regard to the first category
considerable work can be done to secure support for the extension of sanctions
to other areas such as tourism and immigration to Rhodesia and this type of
action will need the United Nations as well as domestic legislation. The same
countries must also be pressed to take direct action against South Africa as the
major sanctions buster. Of course the appropriate action would be to extend
mandatory sanctions against South Africa through the United Nations but in the
meanwhile countries can at least limit their trade with South Africa to the
levels of 1965. This can only be used as a tactical move within certain
countries as a basis for obtaining wider support but it is important to point
out that all economic relations with South Africa directly benefits the
Rhodesian regime as well.
The major feature of a new initiative on
sanctions should therefore rest on the central role of South Africa and the
demand for sanctions against the Apartheid regime must be clearly stated under
the slogan of “sanctions against the
sanctions busters”
The Security Council has determined that
the situation in Rhodesia “constitutes a
threat to international peace and security” and has taken mandatory
decisions under articles 39 and 41 of the Charter. South Africa, as a member of
the United Nations is obliged under the charter to implement mandatory
sanctions against Rhodesia and if it refuses to do so should be subjected to
the same action and suspended from membership of the United Nations.
In the recent move to expel South Africa
from the UN the Western powers used their triple veto to protect the Apartheid
regime and stated that they were concerned with preserving the universality of
the UN. Often in the past when effective action against South Africa has been
suggested at the UN over the question of Apartheid or Namibia the Western
Governments have blocked all action by claiming that it would harm the UN to
adopt policies which it could not implement. If these Western nations are genuinely
concerned about the authority and value of the United Nations then they ought
to at least ensure that the first mandatory programme it has adopted, on the
question of Rhodesia and that the request of Britain should not be undermined
by member states which openly defy the authority of the Security Council.
Future
policy
The fact that the Smith regime is now
under serious pressure is due to the changed situation in Mozambique and the
growing resistance of the African context is valuable and important and needs
to be extended and intensified.
Therefore, what is required now is the
following:
1.
Increased compliance by nations which are at present lax in
implementing UN decisions on sanctions ;
2.
New decisions by the Security Council to make sanctions more
comprehensive;
3.
Representations to the Portuguese Government to forthwith
enforce sanctions against Rhodesia;
4.
Action by states to reduce their economic links with South
Africa since these serve to counteract sanctions against Rhodesia;
5.
Action under Chapter VII of the Charter to secure South
Africa’s compliance.
For a sanctions policy to be really effective
the first pre-condition is to secure compliance of every state – it is for this
reason that the United Nations Charter specifically provides for mandatory
action. But South Africa is permitted to deliberately violate the decisions of
the Security Council which are legally binding on all member states. There are more legal grounds to provide the
basis for international economic sanctions to be enforced against South Africa.
All these efforts however must be seen in
the context of supporting the African liberation struggle rather than in
isolation from it. It is that struggle which will ultimately destroy the system
of white domination and exploitation of Africa.
Abdul S. Minty
Honorary Secretary
British Anti Apartheid Movement
November 1974
6.
The Significance and Legal
Implications Of the Sanctions Campaign for the Progressive Movements in Western
Europe
OUTLINE
SSanctions Campaign: Principles
B.
Sanctions Campaign: Practice
1.
Security Council Resolutions
2.
Legislation in Member States
3.
Enforcement of National Law in Western Europe
C.
Conclusions
SUMMARY
I.
The main content and conclusions in this paper are:
-
A review of United Nations Resolutions and amendments
regarding Southern Rhodesia.
-
A review of EC legislation relating to economic sanctions
against Southern Rhodesia;
-
The Sanctions Campaign is only useful when it serves the
interests of the liberation movements;
-
It is necessary to extend the sanctions campaign to South
Africa because:
a)
South Africa continuously breaks sanctions against Rhodesia;
b)
The interests of the people of Zimbabwe and their liberation
movements are of paramount importance;
-
It It is necessary to strengthen
sanctions legislation in EC countries and to improve on their
implementation;
-
In propagation and implementation of the sanctions campaign
there is a clear task for all progressive movements and individuals;
-
It is necessary to introduce a penal code that is universally
accepted as mandatory under the Security Council of the United Nations;
-
It It is necessary to broaden the boycott into the financial and
services area (insurance, transport etc.)
II.
Experiences of the Dutch Anti Apartheid Movement with its
sanctions campaign during the past years.
Achievements
of our sanctions work
-
With our work public awareness of the situation of not only
Apartheid, but that of the racial system of the Smith rebe1 regime became well
publicised.
-
Improved contacts were laid with political parties who all
got a better understanding and needs of the Southern African liberation
movements.
-
Relations with the Trade Unions were made and maintained with
their active participation in many publicity and public demonstration
activities;
-
B Because of the pressure mounted through the consistent work
of the Dutch AAM the Dutch Government instituted an inter-ministerial committee
to look into our findings and make suggestions on how to follow up with
investigations and prosecution of sanctions busters.
The Dutch AAM is a strong proponent to
extend the boycott to South Africa, whether by UN Security Council or through intensification
of our own sanction campaigns work. With the law as aback up on sanctions
busting the Dutch Anti Apartheid Movement explored and exploited considerable
scope for informal detection wok to drive such an approach.
This
approach has been highly successful in the Netherlands. We need to share with
groups and individuals
from other countries to replicate what we have done
while at the same time learning from their own situations and challenges.
Ultimately we feel that we should strive for a uniform EC approach and laws on
sanctions against Rhodesia.
We do not have answers to many of the
questions we ask of ourselves. As an extension to diplomatic means, sanctions are
always a double-edged sword. As the Zimbabwe liberation movements point out, British
imperialist interests are embedded in UN-driven economic sanctions. However
while they may be marginal to the armed struggle of the liberation movements, they
do form a valuable ancillary means for developing solidarity while at the same
time inflict real damage on the white rebel regime.
So while we are pleading for more
coordination, deepening and broadening of the campaign we must be aware of the
potential that the sanctions policy can also be swung around at the expense of
the liberation movements.
Thus the following questions need to be discussed:
What should be our basic strategy to
support the liberation movements in Southern Africa? Are we limited by weak political
will of government policies? Is it necessary to have one strategy for all
countries, or different strategies for different countries?
With these questions in mind let me expand
on them:
A.
S Sanctions Campaign –
Principles
After the refusal of Great Britain to put
an end to the Rhodesian rebellion with all the power at her disposal, she was
successful in getting the member states of the United Nations to participate in
an economic embargo of the rebel colony. Security Council Resolution 217 (November
20, 1965) considered the United Kingdom as the administrative power and called
on her to put an end to the rebellion. Later resolutions of the Security
Council (No. 253, May 29, 1968 and No. 333, May 22, 1973) introduced two
important legal principles into the UN sanctions campaign against Southern
Rhodesia:
1.
Change the objective of the sanctions campaign; and
2.
An extension of existing provisions of the UN Security
Council Sanctions Resolutions against Rhodesia to apply to South Africa.
1.
A change in the objective
of the sanctions campaign
Although Resolution 253 affirmed that the
primary responsibility for enabling the people of Rhodesia to achieve
self-determination and independence lay with the Government of the United
Kingdom, and in particular noted that the United Kingdom was responsible for
dealing with the prevailing situation, it did nevertheless recognize the
legitimacy of the struggle of the people of Southern Rhodesia to secure their
own rights. Furthermore, although the resolution considered that the U.K. as
administering power should ensure that no settlement be reached without taking
into account the views of the people of Southern Rhodesia, it went further and
urged all member states of the United Nations to render moral and material
assistance to the people of Southern Rhodesia in their struggle to achieve
freedom and independence.
Thus the resolution both acknowledged the
responsibility of the United Kingdom and avowed the rights of the people of
Southern Rhodesia to seek their independence. Given the de facto situation
- - dim prospects for the United Kingdom ever presiding over a settlement of
the Rhodesia situation, and the strong, military challenge by the authentic
organizations of the people (NANU and ZAPU) to the presence of the rebel regime
- - Resolution 253 should now be interpreted unambiguously as a statements that
sanctions must serve as an aid to the struggle of the liberation movements. In
fact, the relevant sections calling for support for the people of Zimbabwe,
introduced under pressure of the Afro-Asian countries, have made it plain that
the central objective of the sanctions campaign is not the return to legality
under the British Constitution, but is support for the liberation movements in
their quest for self determination.
2.
Extension to the provision
of the sanctions campaign to cover South Africa
Recognizing that South Africa was the main
culprit in giving economic and military support to the rebel regime, thereby
effectively sabotaging the U.N. sanctions campaign, the Security Council considered
a resolution calling for direct United Nations action against South Africa. The
resolution, however, was vetoed by the United Kingdom. Instead Resolution 333
was adopted calling upon member states to stop all direct and indirect methods
to evade the provisions of Security Council Resolution 253. The principle to
extend national sanctions measures against Rhodesia to South Africa was
established.
Underlying Security Council Resolution 253
and 333 which call for sanctions against Rhodesia are the principles of support
for the liberation movements and the efficacy of action against South Africa in
order to destroy its vassal state, Rhodesia. Successive governments in the
United Kingdom have however vigorously opposed these principles, and other Western
governments have not yet brought their own legislation sufficiently into line
with the principles of Security Council Resolution 253 and 333. It therefore
becomes imperative for progressive parliamentarians, trade unions and movements
to strive to ensure that these principles are put into practice.
Two other Security Council resolutions
give force to the efforts of progressive parliamentarians and movements to get
a blanket extension of Rhodesian sanctions to South Africa. One is the
resolution condemning the illegal occupation of Namibia by South Africa. The
other is the resolution calling for an embargo on the sale of arms, munitions
and military vehicles to South Africa, or any supplies that would serve to keep
the present armaments industry of South Africa intact. Thus there are at
present sufficient legal provisions to extend sanctions to South Africa, even
though it may be necessary to institute either an individual or group system of
exemptions for types of trade and economic links not yet affected by Security
Council resolutions.
The issue of Rhodesian sanctions and
Southern Africa is becoming vitally important to the trade unions. In June 1973
the Trade Union Group of the International Labour Organization (ILO) called on
member trade unions to institute and report back on programmes to isolate South
Africa economically and to give support to the authentic organizations of the
people. On the basis of present resolutions of the United Nations and also
international organizations there are sufficient grounds for accepting the
principle of sanctions against Rhodesia as support for the liberation
movements, and for viewing present resolutions and national legislation as a
precedent for extending sanctions to South Africa in order to assist the
liberation struggle in Namibia and South Africa.
T The Sanctions Campaign in
Practice
With respect to the sanctions campaign as
it has been executed up to the present one can raise the following questions:
1.
Are the Security Council themselves watertight in a formal
sense?
2.
Have member states introduced the essence of resolutions into
their own laws?
3.
Is there effective enforcement of and compliance with
national sanctions legislation?
1.
The Security Council
Resolutions
The boycott measures of the United Nations
Security Council have not had satisfactory results. One of the main reasons (in
a legal sense) lies in the chosen system whereby each member state is asked to
close its borders against goods destined for or originating in Rhodesia. As
soon as one or more countries do not comply, in varying degrees, with the
resolutions, this system loses its effectiveness.
Moreover one must admit that there are
countries where the political will to rigorously apply the sanctions is absent.
To make the boycott effective one is therefore compelled to abandon the
principle of limited responsibility on the part of each member state for its
own territory. That means that the principles on which present sanctions laws
are based - - the criminal principles of territoriality (criminal
liability only when crime takes place in the country itself) and nationality
(criminal liability limited to own nationals) - - should be substituted by the
principle of universality. Universality means that the trespassing of
the norm - - or attempt to do so, or participate or encourage doing so - - by
anyone, anywhere in the world is punishable in any country where the person may
be. This is the same principle which is applied to piracy and which lies behind
the recent treaty on aircraft hijacking.
To make this possible it will be necessary
to amend the Security Council resolutions in the following way. They should be
defined from the borders of each member state to the borders of Rhodesia
itself. This means that not only the import into and the export from the member
state is punishable, but also the import into and the export from Rhodesia. In
addition to the import and export of goods and services themselves, it is
necessary to include all ancillary services in the prohibition, such as
insurance, transit and promotion practices.
Multinational corporations are able to
undermine sanctions against Rhodesia by means of a series of internal accounts
manipulations affecting various branches throughout the world. To prevent this
practice any interest in a Rhodesian affiliate must also be prohibited as well
as those interests of any corporation which possesses interests in Rhodesia.
The complexity of international bank capital makes prohibition of direct
payments traffic with Rhodesia ridiculous; indirect payments and credits must
therefore also be prohibited.
In resolution 333 (1973), the Security
Council opened up the possibility of extending boycott measures to South
Africa. The relevant text reads:
“Calls upon states (to
punish persons) . . . . . continuing to deal with clients in South Africa,
Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau and Namibia after it has become known that
the clients are re-exporting the goods or components thereof to Southern Rhodesia,
or that the goods received from such clients are of Southern Rhodesian origin.
. . . ”.
The resolution is not practical in this
form. Due to the fact that South African goods at borders are not easily
determined bona fide by customs officials as to stated origin, it is
impossible to detect Rhodesian origin. Even so, if it is discovered that a
South African intermediary is being used, then it is always possible to
continue the trade by instituting a new intermediary, or simply changing the
legal personality of the detected intermediary. Therefore the above boycott
measures must be rewritten in such a way that in general prohibition is
effective for all of South Africa with, if needs be a possibility of individual
or categorical exemptions. Taken together with the Security Council-instituted
prohibitions in 1963 against all trade in munitions, armaments, participation
in South African armaments and military vehicles industry, such an improved
measure can be a stepping stone to further action. The same principles and
objectives pertaining to Rhodesian sanctions should apply to the boycott
against South Africa, i.e. the boycott must be seen as a supportive measure for
the liberation struggle.
2.
Have member states
incorporated the Security Council resolutions into their own laws?
The answer to this question is a clear
“no”. To a greater or lesser extent the essence of the resolutions calling for
support for the liberation struggle in Southern Africa has been completely
submerged by half-hearted measures. Besides, the execution of these
half-hearted measures has been ineffective due to a lack of political will. A
brief rundown is made of the present state of sanctions legislation in a number
of Western European member states:
Belgium
The Security Council resolutions have not
yet led to a legal prohibition of trade with Rhodesia. It is not known to us at
present whether the bill of September25, 1969 has become law. The bill provides
for stricter execution of the present Belgian law and prohibits all import and
export, any commercial act connected with the import and export, payments, the
exploitation (or promotion for exploitation) of sea or air transport from or to
Southern Rhodesia, and also emigration to Southern Rhodesia. In order to comply
with the resolutions three measures have been taken governing trade with
Rhodesia specifically. These are the Ministerial Decisions of December 29,
1965, and April 22, 1969 whereby the import and export from and to Rhodesia is
subjected to a licensing system. This includes transit trade of goods
originating in or destined for Rhodesia. Prohibition of trade with Rhodesia in
principle therefore does not exist, and the execution of the licensing system
is left over entirely to the Belgian Government. In 1963 in answer to questions
in Parliament from the Socialists, the Belgian Government stated that no
licences would be given for armaments exports nor for sugar and tobacco imports
and that no transactions with Rhodesia would be financed or guaranteed by the
Government.
It is clear that the Belgian measures do
not reflect in any way the scope of the Security Council resolutions. Trade
with Rhodesia is not forbidden in principle although it must be conceded that
this trade can be drastically limited with a vigorous licensing policy. The
promotion of trade with Rhodesia is not prohibited, and tourism, emigration and
payments are totally unrestricted.
Federal
Republic of Germany
West Germany, like Belgium, does not
prohibit trade with Southern Rhodesia. Restrictions are placed on Rhodesia
trade by subjecting it to a licensing system. As in Belgium, it is Government
policy which determines the extent to which the trade embargo will be
effective. This licensing system is based on the so-called
“Aussenwirthshaftsverordiningen”, which is based on the “Answirtsschaftsgezetz
of 1961. On grounds of such regulations it is possible for the Federal
Government to refuse permits and this appears already to have been done for the
import of sugar and other Rhodesian products. Certain trading transactions can
be condemned while payments traffic can be controlled. The Federal Republic of
Germany does not have a general prohibition on trade and payments transfers
with Southern Rhodesia, and the licensing system in compliance with the
Security Council resolutions is a question of government policy rather than
autonomous juridical process.
Denmark
The Danish law of May 10, 1967 is a so-called
“frame law”, i.e. one law which makes it possible that whatsoever a resolution
of the Security Council calls for sanctions, these can simply be fitted into
Danish law. This is done by proclamation and therefore Security Council
resolutions calling for tightening up of sanctions do not require lengthy
procedural delays.
This frame law is “filled out” by two
proclamations which forbid the export and import of Rhodesian goods, or the
transport thereof, the sale of munitions and armaments or oil including
petroleum products, the participation in manufacture or assembly of aircraft of
vehicles in Southern Rhodesia, the storage in Danish bonded warehouses of
Rhodesian goods, the sale of goods to Southern Rhodesia or any form of payments
traffic.
The
Security Council resolutions appear to have been translated comprehensively
into Danish law. Despite this entrenchment in the law, a regulation forbidding
immigration, tourism, and transit trade through Rhodesia is still lacking, and
the determination of origin of as consignment of goods, e.g. tobacco is not
clear.
France
France scarcely has any significant legal
regulations to execute the resolutions of the Security Council. The most
important legal measure is the decree of August 23, 1968, which forbids import
and export to Rhodesia with the exception of a large number of goods which are
summarised in an appendix. It is not clear whether contraventions of the decree
are punishable by methods other than extant custom measures carrying a maximum
fine of three times the value of the goods. Further, by ministerial directive
of December 24, 1965, the export of oil (products) and air communications with
Rhodesia are forbidden. It is clear that France has not complied by a far way
with the obligations imposed by the Security Council resolutions regarding
Rhodesia. Only the import and the export of certain goods are forbidden and
contraventions are punishable by very small fines. In principal, all trade is
allowed.
Ireland
The first indications of the way in which
Ireland was to execute sanctions against Rhodesia came in a letter from the
Irish permanent representative to the United Nations to the Secretary General,
after Resolution 232 was accepted. This letter stated that all imports from
Southern Rhodesia were prohibited and that all financial transactions with the
country came under “exchange control”. Export to Rhodesia of arms, war
material, aircraft, vehicles, oil and oil products were forbidden. Transporting
the listed goods in aircraft or ships of Irish registration was also
prohibited. Export insurance with state guarantee would not be possible for
goods going to Rhodesia. The Government had no intention of giving financial or
economic help to Rhodesia.
In order to execute Security Council
Resolution 253 the control over exports had to be intensified. This was
accomplished by the Statutory Instruments of May and June, 1969, more than a
year after the passing of Resolution 253.The Statutory Instruments made it
possible to subject the export of industrial, agricultural and fishing products
to a prohibition, barring exemptions. In a later Statutory Instrument, the
applicability of the first two instruments was extended to Shannon Airport,
which is outside the Irish customs regime. It is not known whether there are
sanctions on contravention of these measures. The Irish case is also an example
of fairly comprehensive and watertight measures but enforcement procedures are
neglected. Also, the way in which triangular transit trade can be prohibited
remains unclear.
Italy
The bill of October 3, 1968 which became
law six weeks later nullified previous measures against trade with Rhodesia.
The Italian law took over the wording of operational parts of Resolution 253.
The law is applicable to Italians at home and abroad, and states that goods
coming out of free ports must be cleared to determine that they are not of
Rhodesian origin. Contracts with respect to deals which are prohibited by law
(and these are all deals mentioned in Resolution 253) are declared null and
void. Contravention of the law is punishable by a maximum of two years
imprisonment and a maximum fine of four times the value of the goods in
question. It appears that the Italian sanctions law is exemplary in a formal
sense.
Norway
The Norwegian law of June 7, 1968, which
was enacted in response to the boycott resolutions, has the peculiarity that
the word “Rhodesia” does not appear in its wording. Thus, should the Security
Council extend the boycott to South Africa then the Norwegian law will be
applicable automatically. The law states no more than that the government can
issue proclamations to execute Security Council resolutions which by definition
are binding in Norwegian law. The law is similar in its “frame law”
construction to the Danish law. The actual or attempted importation and
exportation of those goods mentioned in royal decrees is forbidden as are
payments traffic specified in the decrees under pain of six months’
imprisonment, a fine, and confiscation of goods.
The Norwegian law is “filled out” by
additional royal decree of June 26, 1968. Any act facilitating exportation of
any product or any goods from Southern Rhodesia is forbidden; this includes the
transportation of goods or products from Southern Rhodesia on Norwegian
territory, trade and delivery of any product from Norway or Norwegian citizen,
the transportation of goods destined for Southern Rhodesia with Norwegian
vessels, financial aid or investment. Southern Rhodesians or any person having
encouraged the illegal regime, are not admitted on Norwegian territory. What are
lacking here also are a prohibition of transport of goods by Norwegian shippers
and a specific prohibition on emigration and tourism.
The
Netherlands
Dutch legislation on Southern Rhodesia is
particularly deficient and confused. In 1966 an import and export prohibition
was proclaimed by a general government decree. Subsequently it appeared that
most trade with Rhodesia continued unabated because of a major loophole
existed, i.e. the 1966 proclamation did not include trade through bonded ware
houses (Rotterdam harbour handles enormous quantities of international transit
trade). Therefore in 1968 an improvement was made by another proclamation based
on a completely antiquated pre-war law.
At the end of 1973 a law was made
forbidding payments traffic with Rhodesia. A novelty in this law was the
prohibition of indirect transactions, an amendment successfully made by Mr.
Relus ter Beek M.P. (Dutch Labour Party). Besides these measures the Dutch
Government has various gentleman’s agreements with Dutch business interests to
refrain from all business connections with Rhodesia which fall under U.N.
resolutions, but not under the Dutch criminal code. Exposures by the Dutch Anti
Apartheid Movement on sanctions breaking highlighted the farcical nature of
voluntary agreements between state and business. The exposures also revealed
the deficiency of the law in coping with proved smugglers and the virtual powerlessness
of the investigating authorities. As a result of these exposures the Dutch
Government has instituted an investigation of its laws on sanctions-breaking by
an interdepartmental commission, the “Kooijmans Commission”.
3.
Enforcement of National
Sanctions Law in Western Europe
How effective is the enforcement of
sanctions laws? Investigations of the Dutch Anti Apartheid Movement (Zephyr
Report, Tobacco Report, KLM among the more important) have made it apparent
that not only is smuggling prevalent but that it has assumed An international
character of its own. Moreover, it is difficult to eliminate the smugglers by
legal means.
The following are the main problems:
-
Generally speaking adequate prohibition is lacking.
-
Authorities do not sufficiently have investigative power.
-
The burden of proof presses heavily on the prosecuting
authority: in fact so heavy
-
That successful prosecution is more the exception than the
rule.
-
Coordination of investigation of smuggling should be
explored.
Some countries such as the
Netherlands and Switzerland have come to gentleman’s agreements between
business and the state. It has been demonstrated in practice that these
agreements are meaningless, to say the least. (cf. The Dutch AAM exposures on
KLM).
A necessary pre-condition to serious
execution of a boycott is sharply defined criminal clauses prohibiting
Rhodesian trade. When these are missing there is no possibility of a
successful legal action to crack down on contraventions. The opinion of the
Dutch AAM is that criminal sanctions are absolutely necessary. The alternative
to these would be administrative or economic-political measures, the execution
of which is completely a matter of government policy and discretion. Criminal
sanctions are less dependent on the executive power of states, which, given the
Dutch experience for one, generally lack the political will to seriously
challenge industrial and commercial interests.
The Dutch AAM position does not imply that
administrative or economic-political measures are not useful. On the contrary
they can play a valuable secondary role in supporting criminal, legislative measures.
If one lesson was clearly demonstrated by
the Zephyr exposure, it was that one cannot rely on the political will of
western states to do the very necessary detection work. If a small group of
Dutch activists could expose an international smuggling network, what could
western state intelligence services have been able to do in comparison, given
their enormous resources? The unavoidable conclusion is that there is a
complete lack of political will to authorize serious investigations.
It is part of the task of the seminar to
investigate: (1) How the political will
can be strengthened by mobilizing progressive political elements in
governments, and (2) How political pressures can be built up outside parliament
by the trade union movement and by the work of extra-parliamentary groups along
the lines of the Dutch AAM experience.
C. Conclusions
1.
Sanctions
campaigns in western countries make sense only if they are mounted as support
for the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe, South Africa and Namibia.
2.
The United
Nations Security Council sanctions resolution on Rhodesia should be extended as
a matter of principle to South Africa not only because South Africa is
subverting sanctions against Rhodesia, but because in principle sanctions
are in support of the Zimbabwe liberation movement (Resolution 253). Therefore
in principle sanctions should similarly be applied to South Africa as support
for the liberation struggle in South Africa and Namibia.
3.
Sanctions
laws must be strengthened in the western member states. They should primarily
be part of the criminal codes of laws of the various member states and be
backed by administrative measures. In this way there is maximum room for
progressive movements within western countries to provoke and, if needs be,
embarrass governments into severing economic ties with white-ruled Southern
Africa.
4.
The scope of
the sanctions campaign must be broadened. The application of the principal of
universality of the crime of sanctions breaking should be demanded by the
Security Council.
5.
The depth of
the campaign must be increased to reach all indirect links, especially in the
financial and equity-participation spheres and ancillary services such as
insurance, brokerage, transport and transit trade.
Advocate Annemieke Gerritsma
Sanctions Task Team, Dutch Anti Apartheid
Movement
7.
ICFTU Involvement with Sanctions
and Trade Union Rights in Rhodesia
The
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) has throughout its
history championed the cause of human freedom, as we believe that democracy is
the first prerequisite for free trade unionism. The situation in Southern
Africa where the most basic human and trade union rights and freedom are being
consistently denied or violated has therefore been and shall continue to be one
of our major preoccupations.
In this framework the ICFTU has been very
much concerned over the deteriorating situation in Rhodesia. Having expressed
profound shock at the Universal Declaration of Independence and later the
Declaration of a Rhodesian Republic, we have time and again pleaded for
comprehensive and mandatory sanctions and other measures to put an end to the
minority racist regime and to establish human and trade union rights in that
country. Complaints to the ILO against the regime’s violation of human and
trade union rights, as well as testimonies to the United Nations, have been
submitted on various occasions.
We have opposed all negotiations for independence
before majority rule and statements to this effect have been sent to the
British Government and the United Nations. The 54th meeting of the
ICFTU Executive Board adopted a resolution expressing profound concern at the
agreement between the Rhodesian minority regime and the British Government,
which “takes no account of the view and wishes of the African peoples in that
country. . . .” The resolution also called on the British Government to refuse
to grant independence to Rhodesia before majority rule and before human and
trade union rights have been established and guaranteed.
In January 1972, a copy of this resolution
was sent to the British Prime Minister with a letter in which we also expressed
concern of the ICFTU over the use of tear gas and shooting by Rhodesian police
at African workers on strike at the Shabani Asbestos Mine.
After the results of the Pearce Commission
were made known, the ICFTU issued a statement on May 24 1972 reiterating that
the African Rhodesians ought to be given opportunities, deliberately withheld
from them by the oppressor, to prepare themselves for the responsibilities of
government.
The ICFTU 10th World Congress
(London 10-14 July 1972) adopted a resolution appealing to the British
Government to refrain from any negotiations with the minority regime of
Rhodesia and to call a constitutional conference with the full participation of
the representatives of the African majority to establish democratic rule based
on one man one vote.
The ICFTU wrote on the 27 July to the
Olympic Committee conveying dismay at the decision taken by the Committee to
invite Rhodesian athletes to the Olympic Games, pointing out that such an
invitation was against the letter and spirit of the United Nations Security Council’s
resolutions of 1968 and 1970.
Deeply disturbed by the decision of the
British Government to make certain concessions in sanctions against Rhodesia,
the ICFTU General Secretary cabled the United Nations on 14th
November 1972 stressing that such concessions would compromise international
efforts aimed at ending the illegal regime and restoration of human and trade
union rights.
The importance of maintaining strictest
application of sanctions was again emphasised when the Smith regime began introducing,
in November1972, South African-type pass laws and promoting racial job
reservation through legislative proposals.
The international free trade union
movement is equally very much concerned over the conditions in Rhodesian mines.
At the time of the Wankie Mine disaster in June 1972 in which 500 miners were
feared dead, the ICFTU conveyed its deep shock and distress. Relief assistance was
given to the families of the victims.
Following the arrests of a number of
leading trade unionists and members of the Zimbabwe liberation movements in
August 1973, the ICFTU sent a cable to the British Prime Minister at the
Commonwealth Ministers’ meeting in Ottawa expressing its dismay at the arrests
and detentions without trial, and called upon the British government to take
the strongest measures which would force the Rhodesians to return to legality
with a view to ensuring that human and trade union rights be established. The
British Government replied that although “British
constitutional responsibility for Rhodesia is not matched in present
circumstances by a corresponding power to control events there” they are
continuing to “urge upon the Rhodesians
of all shades of view that they should discuss among themselves proposals for a
settlement that will allow Rhodesia to return to constitutional legality”.
The ICFTU General Secretary appeared
before the UN Special Political Committee in October 1973 on which occasion he
submitted list of 65 African trade union detainees in Rhodesia appealing for
appropriate action to be taken to ensure their release. The ICFTU gives legal
and relief assistance to African trade union detainees and their families.
We are also in regular contact with the
African trade union movement in Rhodesia giving assistance where necessary.
Currently, there are 22 African trade unions in Rhodesia. There is indeed a
great need for a strong and viable African trade union movement in that
country, for the minority racist regime does not even hesitate to introduce
forced labour to promote its ends. The ICFTU protested in strongest terms
against the introduction of this practice and other measures on South African
Apartheid lines. In our letter of 12 February 1974 addressed to the United Nations
we once again appealed for “sanctions
against Rhodesia must be fully implemented and that the strongest measures be
taken to establish human and trade union rights in Rhodesia”.
A further letter concerning forced labour
was addressed to the British Government.
Why are sanctions against Rhodesia
breached time and again? It is mainly because Rhodesia’s main export products
such as tobacco are cheap. They are cheap because of the blatant exploitation
of African labour. In the agricultural sector, such exploitation has been legalized
through the Masters’ and Servants’ Act on the same lines as the same act in
South Africa, which has recently been revoked because of world pressure. In
Rhodesia, it still is very much in force. When the General Secretary of the
Agricultural and Plantation Workers’ Union, P.J. Mpofu, submitted a memorandum
on the need for a rationalisation of industrial regulation governing the
agricultural industry in Rhodesia to the Minister of Labour and Social Welfare
in 1973,he was subsequently detained and is still in prison. He is receiving
relief assistance from the international labour movement.
The Rhodesian Financial Gazette reported
in October 1974 on the basis of a study into the Poverty Datum Line (PDL) and
wage levels in Rhodesia that over 90% of all African employees outside the
European agricultural sector receive less that $70 cash wages a month which is
considerably less than the PDL relevant to their family size. Yet, the study
admits that a family unit will, in fact, require income greater than its PDL
before it can actually purchase all the items listed as essential in the
minimum quantities stated.
As in South Africa, Rhodesian Government
authorities and employers are reluctant to see African workers properly trained
or promoted. In order to obtain the required skilled and semi-skilled labour,
they resort to recruitment campaigns in Europe. Significantly, the influx of
blue collar workers to Rhodesia – particularly in the engineering industry – is
gathering momentum with a net gain so far this year of 545. It has been
revealed that the South Africa Embassy in London is actively helping to recruit
immigrants for Rhodesia in clear defiance of British sanctions laws. The
Embassy is giving prospective immigrants printed slips containing the name and
address of the “voluntary” Rhodesian Information and Publicity Service, which
then advises them on how to reach Rhodesia.
In January this year, the ICFTU sent out a
circular to all affiliated organizations in industrialised countries and to the
International Trade Secretariat appealing to them to impress upon their
membership the implications of immigration to Rhodesia and to bring the matter
to the attention of their governments pointing out that immigration to Rhodesia
constitutes a violation of the UN-imposed mandatory sanctions. A letter was
also addressed to the United Nations and to the British Government.
In February this year, following reports
of sanctions-busting in Switzerland, the ICFTU requested its Swiss affiliate to
bring every pressure to bear on its government to ensure that United Nations
Sanctions be fully implemented.
It is clear that the order to obtain the
desired result from sanctions – and it is generally accepted that they are
indeed the best weapon, if properly implemented, to bring the illegal Rhodesian
regime to heel – concerted action at international level is necessary. It is
well known that cigarettes, such as Rothmans, are made with Rhodesian tobacco;
that Rhodesian meat finds its way to Europe; that some UN-member states allow
Rhodesian aircraft to unload goods which make their way to European markets.
This situation can be arrested only if all institutions, international
organizations and their bodies believing in democracy take it upon themselves to
act as a watchdog taking immediate action whenever sanctions-busting – in any
form – has been discovered.
The ICFTU shall, of course, continue with
its action until such time as human and trade union rights have been fully
established in Rhodesia.
Andrew M. Kailembo
ICFTU Representative
8.
Final Plenary Session
In winding up the proceedings of the morning,
participants discussed in depth the problems and dangers of a sanctions
campaign and the experience of the Dutch Anti Apartheid Movement as platform
for continuing support for the liberation movements. In the final session delegations
from a number of countries wished to put proposals before the conference as way
forward.
Anti Imperialist Solidarity Committee Berlin / Pieter Dietzel
The West German Anti Imperialist
Solidarity Committee regards this conference of major importance and puts it to
the house that more such meetings should be held on a more regular basis. More
frequent exchanges of international experiences and meanings are of key
importance for an overall understanding particularly with regard to the
imperialist motifs that the British government has embedded in the United
Nations Security Council-driven sanction campaign. The experience of the Dutch
Anti Apartheid Movement is an ideal for an international tribunal against colonialism
and racism in Southern Africa.
Such a tribunal is being planned to be
held in West Germany in February 1975 addressing solidarity for the Third World
more generally. At this tribunal information will be given on the role of West
German capital in Southern Africa. This will be done on the basis of concrete
examples. Also the supporting role of the West German Government will be
outlined.
Through this tribunal we aim to bring
local activities in West Germany to a higher political level and lay the basis
for a mass movement for political and material support for the liberation
movements. The support of trade unions will be of essential significance. At
this seminar we are once more made aware that the West German exploiters are
the same as in their own country.
Information
Centre Southern Africa, Bonn / Christa Brandt
In
West Germany there is no group that has a similar level of experience and
research capacity as the Dutch Anti apartheid Movement. She supported the
proposal of the previous speaker that the Dutch movement act in future as a
coordinating body for developing a deeper understanding and practical
engagement to support liberation in Southern Africa. All information regarding
sanctions busting should be regularly relayed to Amsterdam and from there
coordinated and prepared for more seminars of this nature. Information work,
both in terms of detection of sanctions busting and dissemination of knowledge
on Southern Africa to the general public needs to be done at the local level.
But it remains important to get a broader understanding by looking at our
challenges from an EC perspective.
Dutch
Labour Party / Mr. Relus ter Beek
Mr. Relus ter Beek M.P. supports the idea
for international coordination. By means
of the cooperation between politicians and action groups in the Netherlands he
explains that an internationally coordinated cooperation model between
progressive politicians and extra parliamentary movements in different
countries can become immensely influential.
Centre
for Social Action, New York / Don Morton
Don Morton considered a coordinator for the
whole sanctions campaign internationally of the greatest possible importance
and wholeheartedly supports previous speakers making the proposal.
He gave a description of the work being
done regarding Southern Africa and the close relations of the Centre for Social
Action with the National Council of Churches in New York, and the World Council
of Churches in Geneva. The CSA was also closely involved with the Gulf Oil
Boycott Coalition regarding the involvement of this corporation in Cabinda. On
the sanction campaigning front there was ongoing confrontation with the US
Government regarding the soc-called Byrd Amendment exempting the importation of
chrome from Rhodesia. This action also involved solidarity with the
International Longshoremen (harbour workers) who refused to offload a ship in
New York harbour carrying Rhodesian chrome.
There was already a strong bilateral
relationship with the Dutch Anti Apartheid Movement. The KLM exposures was
initiated in the United States and shared with the Dutch Movement. On both
asides of the Atlantic a further 22 airlines and a host of travel agencies were
exposed in one hub of conspiracy in organising tourism to Rhodesia. Involved in
this conspiracy were auto hire businesses and hotels (Hertz, Avis and the Holiday
Inn). This action was decentralized and led to a large number of protest
actions, some in the form of direct actions, against offices in more than 20
cities across the United States. There was an enormous amount of publicity over
a number of months as the exposures were made piecemeal and after preparation
with local groups.
The CSA is regularly involved in
shareholder actions which provide ongoing pinpricks and media coverage on the
role US corporations supporting the white minority regimes in Southern Africa.
The Churches, student movement as well as cooperation with some Black Panther
groups are the main planks in a platform for a nascent Anti Apartheid Movement
USA (AAMUSA). Located in New York there are also many meetings of a formal and
informal nature with the Sanctions Committee, Special Committee on Apartheid,
Decolonisation Committees and meetings with leaders of the liberation movements
based or visiting New York for work at the United Nations.
Besides having a central point for
coordination, which he concurs should be in Amsterdam, he believes that local
groups, especially in New York, should act as independent nodal points doing
what they can do best. A central point should involve communications and all
country groups should have maximum opportunity to concentrate on their own
situations without being dependent on a “centre”. Much more important than
having a fixed centre doing everything we should strive to develop a flexible programme
of action. We could use the telex of the
World Council of Churches as dissemination point.
He also suggested that a close watch be
kept by each group on shipping and cargo agencies.
Danish
Anti Apartheid Movement
The
Danish Movement has it easy and not much work to do beyond public teach-ins,
information dissemination and public education on the situation in Southern
Africa. Since 1965 the Danish Government has sentenced 41 companies to fines
totalling about f 750.000. So the sanctions legislation is being observed and
offenders prosecuted. Besides, there is very little trade between Denmark and
Rhodesia. The Danish AAM also supports the idea of a regular seminar of this
nature organized and centralized with by the Dutch Anti apartheid Movement.
British
Anti Apartheid Movement / Mr. Mike Terry
Mike Terry explained that the work of the
British AAM concentrates mainly on exposing the weaknesses of sanctions. The
approach is different from the Dutch and only occasionally are blatant
exposures of sanctions-busting done in England. These involve mainly media
activities carrying advertisements for immigration to Rhodesia and British
Airways which has an office in Rhodesia.
He supports the proposal of Christa Brandt
that the Dutch Anti Apartheid Movement should carry out the international
coordination and wishes to specify this on two points:
1.
Some cases have
been put before the court whereby experience shows that the fines were small in
relation to the profits made. Many companies have not been fined at all because
of the authorities concerned did not take any action. Besides the tendency
appears to blame the African countries. All this information has to be put
together and passed on to organizations in the various countries.
2.
At first sight
this research work is not popular and it requires special experience and
motivation. The Dutch Anti Apartheid Movement could give bilateral support for
starting and operating of small national groups for detection of sanctions
busting. In this connection he thought also of Japan, where very much interest
for this type of work exists.
British
Labour Party / Mr. James Christie
Mr. Christie felt that it is of major
importance that there is coordination of all activities whoever the coordinator
will be. This should be the group with the most experience, which has contacts
with the action groups and the relevant political parties and/or politicians.
British
Anti Apartheid Movement / Abdul Minty
Abdul Minty considered reports like those
from the Dutch Anti Apartheid Movement to be necessary and to be emulated in other
countries as well. There needs to be more information on the nature of
sanctions and how they are applied at a country-by-country level. This is
important not only to increase the efficacy of Anti Apartheid Movements in
their own countries, but also for distribution of information to international
organizations like the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity and
the Commonwealth Secretariat in London. These organizations normally get their
information solely through official channels permitted by individual
governments. International organizations can hardly attack national governments
and institutions. Whereas supplementary information like that of the Dutch Anti
Apartheid Movement can play a vital role. Also the African states must have
information from the action groups to make their accusations more concrete.
He warns for not being willing to
cooperate with the African states because this can easily be used by
industrialized countries with the argument that if African states break
sanctions why should the industrialized states not do so? It is important to
clarify the position of African states on the same basis as this is being done
with the western countries regarding sanctions busting.
In his view the conclusion of the seminar
is that much more work needs to be done in the field of exposing sanctions
busters and ensuring that legal systems are in place to prosecute on the basis
of Mandatory UN Security Council resolutions. Sanctions taken up in this way
are a very valuable means for disseminating information and building moral and
material support for the liberation movements. Also exposing sanctions as
effectively as done in the Netherlands can embarrass countries into taking action.
The Dutch AAM could do very useful work in
coordinating and replicating its own methods among other country AAMs. But he
wishes to go a step further by involving the international diplomatic level
where we have a strong majority to work with. The Organization of African Unity
plays a vital role in this. In consultation with the liberation movements and
the Dutch AAM it might be possible to establish a comprehensive programme for
action for the various groups concerning sanctions and sanctions busting. This
cooperation is important to prove offences and to check on consistent
implementation at the country level. Mr. Minty’s final conclusions are that it
is important to realise that there is a lot of work to be done on sanctions.
The most constructive part of the seminar was the proposal that the Anti
Apartheid Movement in the Netherlands will try to take on the international
coordination of the sanctions campaign. There will be talks with the liberation
movements on this matter. Bi-lateral contacts, as proposed already is a process
that has started with the holding of this seminar and will be extended.
ICFTU,
Mr. Kailembo
Mr Kailembo regrets that the seminar
abandoned its academic character only towards the final session. The ICFTU has
a coordination commission for Southern Africa, in which representatives of the
trade unions in the industrialized countries take part. In this commission also
the liberation of Rhodesia is discussed and whatever the ICFTU can contribute
to this end. By means of two examples:
1) An anti immigration to Rhodesia action
against the South African Embassy in London in Britain itself. This is being
undertaken by a number of trade unions.
2) An investment boycott action in which a
number of corporations are being targeted.
Mr. Kailembo draws the conclusion that the
ICFTU through its relations can contribute to the support of the struggle in
Southern Africa and the awakening of the workers in the industrialized
countries. He underlines the significance of cooperation with the Anti
Apartheid Movements in this field. Mr. Kailembo feels that it is possible
through the coordination commission of the ICFTU to exert all forms of pressure
on governments of the industrialized countries to effectuate the sanctions
campaign against the illegal minority regime in Rhodesia.
9.
PRESS RELEASE – JOINT
STATEMENT BY ZANU & ZAPU
The people of Zimbabwe have been highly honoured by
the organization and holding of this seminar on sanctions against the British
colonial regime of Southern Rhodesia.
We take this opportunity to salute the
Anti Apartheid Movement of the Netherlands whose tireless work in exposing
sanctions-busting has embarrassed many governments. In addition, its
multi-sided activities in collaboration with the Transnational Institute have
resulted in this very important undertaking in the history of the liberation
struggle of the people of Zimbabwe to regain their usurped freedom, land and
rights.
We also extend a hand of comradeship to
the participants in this seminar with the conviction that their contributions
will seek adoption of decisions leading to implementation of relevant
appropriate measures to support methods that will effectively deal paralyzing
blows to the British settler regime of Rhodesia.
Available information shows blatant
sanctions-busting by practically all imperialist countries whose insatiable
capitalist appetite drives them to overlook clandestine networks operating
before their noses, breaking sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security
Council. This only affirms that the nature of capitalism will never allow the
UN-backed sanctions to cripple the British colonial regime in Rhodesia. We
therefore, restate to the international community that the imposition of
sanctions against Rhodesia, an act initiated by the British government, was and
is an outrageous British imperialist trick aimed at deceiving, misdirecting and
misleading the world. It is a plot by which the world has been set on a wild goose-chase
turning it away from the real issue. The problem is British colonialism in
Zimbabwe. Its elimination will guarantee peace and normal intercourse, in all
aspects of international relations, with the people of Zimbabwe under
conditions of national independence.
To remove the political impasse in
Rhodesia, the people of Zimbabwe have long embarked on a people’s war. That is
the method, appropriate and practicable to bring down the British colonial
regime in our motherland. It is toward the support of this aspect of the
struggle that we appeal to you to direct all your efforts.
Already, many of our compatriots have died
others are in death cells, prisons, detention and concentration camps. We are
under national obligation to appeal to you all for material and financial
assistance. This will enable us to carry out the revolution with accelerated
tempo and shorten the period of oppression and exploitation of the black people
of Zimbabwe.
We also appeal for humanitarian assistance
to deal with mounting welfare cases. Dependents of our comrades in death-cells,
prisons, detention and concentration camps and those that have fallen in battle
need food, clothing, shelter and education.
We also want to benefit by this occasion
and express our standpoint in relation to rumours being circulated by the
British government about the possibility of a constitutional conference to
settle the Rhodesian problem. This is not the stage of talking about
constitutional conferences. We are fighting a people’s war for our liberation.
We cannot sacrifice lives to achieve constitutional conferences. Ours is a
revolutionary onslaught to eradicate the British colonial regime from Zimbabwe.
In conclusion, we express hope that the
decisions and conclusions of this very historic seminar will take continuation
of sanctions against Rhodesia as an expression of solidarity and with support
of the people of Zimbabwe in the struggle for total eradication of the British
colonial set-up in our country. Let it be a pace-setter to embark on relevant
and effective programmes to support the armed struggle in Zimbabwe.
Thank you,
Statement
by:
Philemon T. Makonese, Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) Representative in
Zambia and Member of the Revolutionary Council & T.J.P. Jokonya,,
Chairman of Zimbabwe African National Union and Representative in the UK and
Western Europe, On the occasion of the Rhodesian Sanctions Seminar organised by
the Dutch Anti Apartheid Movement (AABN) and the Transnational Institute,
Amsterdam, November 29 & 30 November 1974.
Concluding
Speech by Relus ter Beek (MP) Dutch Labour Party.
Mr. Chairman,
When we started this seminar almost 30
hours ago on Sanctions against Sothern Rhodesia it was already clear from the
beginning that we should not deal with this topic in isolation but we have to
look at Southern Africa as a whole. One cannot isolate Namibia from South
Africa or Rhodesia from Mozambique. The developments in Southern Africa are
interrelated and our analysis of the situation in Southern Africa should be
based on this interrelationship. So also our strategy, our means to change that
situation in the direction we want. We did not make this mistake at this
seminar to overlook this interrelationship.
We also discussed sometimes more,
sometimes less in detail this situation in Southern Africa. We also did not
make the other mistake of concentrating ourselves only on the question of
sanctions. But by avoiding these mistakes I sometimes got the feeling that we
were creating unnecessary confusion amongst ourselves about the meaning of the
sanctions campaign by making some remarks which could only be interpreted as a
taking a minimal meaning of sanctions. Therefore allow me to end this seminar
by stating what I think should now be done.
Firstly, sanctions against Southern
Rhodesia are not an end in themselves, but a means to an end. This is the view
also of the liberation movement of Zimbabwe. And taking into consideration the
already changed and still changing situation in Southern Africa our first
priority as activists, trade unions and progressive political parties our first
priorities are the interests of the liberation movements. We give them our full
support, in fact to ZANU and ZAPU!
We have to support ZANU and ZAPU in their
struggles, a struggle which should also be ours. That is why the need for a
standing communication between the liberation movements in Southern Africa and
we in Western Europe is important to follow through.
I said sanctions are not an end in
themselves. Sanctions are an instrument to utilise in building solidarity in as
far as they contribute to the liberation struggle. And I think it is true that
a sanctions campaign focussing on improving their efficacy do contribute to the
struggle because, as has been shown during this conference, these campaigns
give us enormous opportunities to make clear what the nature of the problem is.
The Smith regime is not just an illegal regime. It is an oppressive racist
regime. And Smith’s regime should be brought down and replaced by a democratic
government of the people.
So it is towards this end that we have the
means with the implementation of the sanctions campaign to contribute to this
aim. It’s the way we have to look upon the nature of oppression and domination
in Rhodesia, through the views offered by sanctions campaigning.
That is why I was most satisfied and happy
with the discussion this afternoon when all these concrete proposals came up.
And I think that is also another reason why we all have to thank the Anti
Apartheid Movement here in the Netherlands of which I am a proud and
enthusiastic about its high level of activities here in the Netherlands. That is why we have to thank the Movement for
organizing this seminar, this conference; a seminar of international standing.
And this is just the beginning. We have greater achievements to look forward
to!
The beginning of international cooperation
among action groups, trade unions and political parties started at this
conference. All are fighting for the same aim which is the liberation of
Zimbabwe!
And that is why I think we cannot finish
this seminar in another way than pledging our full support for the people of
Zimbabwe for their outstanding representatives of ZANU and ZAPU. We pledge out
full support to the movements they represent!
Thank
you!
Relus ter Beek (MP), Dutch Labour
Party
November
1974
(Minutes prepared by Helen Hopps, TNI)
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